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Mehmet Ali Soytas, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
Models of dynastic households have been traditionally used to analyze persistence in earn-
ings and wealth across generations, more recently to study patterns of wealth and fertility,
transfers to children and education choices. However most of those models have looked at the
theoretical outcomes and there are some limited calibration studies. Some other literature
follows the regression based techniques to answer empirical questions regarding the genera-
tional transfers. In Chapter 2 -co-authored with Gayle and Golan- we develop an estimator
that makes the structural estimation of dynastic models feasible. We propose an estimation
framework for dynastic models which allows the estimation of the problem in several steps.
Our estimator compared to the full solution structural estimation known as the Nested Fixed
Point Algorithm (NFXP) performs comparable in small samples while reducing the compu-
tation time considerably. A Monte Carlo exercise compares our estimator to the NFXP. We
show that the alternative representation of the continuation value of the problem enables us
to apply the Hotz and Miller (1993) estimation to the dynastic problem.
Using data of two generations from the PSID, Chapter 3 estimates a dynastic life-cycle
model with endogenous fertility, labor supply and inter-generational transfers. This chap-
ter uses data on time spent with children and measures outcomes in terms of education.
Education and skills both a¤ect the childrens earnings and marriage market outcomes sto-
chastically. We contribute to the literature by measuring the returns in a life-cycle dynastic
model in which fertility and time spent with children is endogenous and the di¤erent aspects
of returns to investment (i.e. education and skill) in children are aggregated and measured
in terms of their life-time utility. We model couples decisions as a noncooperative game and
iii
solve for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in pure strategies. Therefore the valuation
functions of the dynastic model are not only the optimal solution to the problem given the
state variables for the individual, but they are the best response valuation functions given
the spouses choice. This requires an equilibrium choice which we assume as MPE in pure
strategies.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Models of dynastic households have been traditionally used to analyze persistence in earnings
and wealth across generations (e.g. Loury (1981)(53) Laitner (1992)(50), Barro and Becker
(1988, 1989)(8)(9), and more recently to study patterns of wealth and fertility, transfers
to children and education choices. A number of recent empirical papers study models of
intergenerational transfers. Rios-Rull and Marcos (2002)(70) study the returns of parental
investment in childrens education, their earnings and marriage market, Doepke and Tertilt
(2009)(29) allow the returns on investment in childrens human capital to depend on the
parentseducation. Echevarria and Merlo (1999)(30) model household bargaining in which
gender gap in parental investment in education of the children arises endogenously. Doepke
(2004)(28) extends Barro and Becker (1989)(9) model by allowing uncertainty over the num-
ber of children. Albanesi and Olivetti (2010)(2) link the pattern of the baby boom and
bust to the improvement in maternal health. Being theoretically useful, however structural
estimation of these models face computational obstacles. The problem can be solved with a
nested xed point algorithm (NFXP), it becomes computationally intensive quickly, limiting
the scope of the problem that can be analyzed.
In Chapter 2 - joint with George Gayle and Limor Golan - we propose a framework
for estimation of dynastic intergenerational models by developing a new representation of
the problem in terms of the models primitives and choice probabilities which allows for the
estimation of the problem in several steps. The di¢ culty of estimating the model is due to
the non-standard nature of the problem. While the problem can be solved with a nested xed
point algorithm, it becomes computationally intensive quickly. Our intergenerational model
has nite (T ) periods in the lifecycle in each generation and innitely many generations are
linked by the altruistic preferences. In this respect our model is close to Laitner (1992)(50).
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Laitners framework however, does not t into a nite horizon dynamic discrete choice model
since in the last period T , there is a continuation value associated with the next generations
problem which is linked to current generation by the transfers and the discount factor.
Therefore we develop a representation for the next generations continuation value that
allows us to treat the problem as a standard T period problem which can be solved by
backwards induction. We show that the alternative representation of the continuation value
of the intergenerational problem enables us to derive the necessary representation and apply
the Hotz and Miller estimation technique for single agent problems to the dynastic problem.
The framework we developed can be used to estimate a large class of dynastic models with
endogenous choices in the lifecyle which have intergenerational consequences. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the rst paper to structurally estimated dynastic model with altruistic
preferences.
The framework we developed can be used to estimate a large class of dynastic models with
endogenous labor supply, transfers to children, fertility, and household bargaining. Loury
(1981)(53) is one of the rst to model the e¤ect of parental income on o¤springs productivity,
Laitner (1992)(50) incorporates lifecycle decisions into the intergenerational framework, and
Barro and Becker (1988,1989)(8)(9) analyze fertility decisions. Alverez (1999)(5) provides a
general framework which incorporates fertility and transfers. The third chapter structurally
estimate a dynastic models with altruistic preferences. It uses the developed estimation
technique to empirically address the quantity quality trade o¤ regarding the children. Using
data of two generations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), chapter 3 de-
velops and estimates a dynastic life-cycle model with endogenous fertility, labor supply and
intergenerational transfers. Specically, individuals choose fertility, labor supply sequentially
in their lifecycle. The focus of the empirical applications is on the e¤ect of parental choices
and characteristics on childrens labor market outcomes, and the quantity-quality trade-o¤s
involved in fertility decisions across education groups, and householdscharacteristics. We
estimate the utility parameters of the spouses within the households. Also we estimate the
generation discount factor and nd that the marginal value of children is decreasing in the
number of previous birth. Our paper is related to Kang (2010)(48) which estimates a life-
cycle model of parental transfers, fertility and labor supply capturing the quantity-quality
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trade-o¤, in a model without dynastic component. Our paper, however, uses data on ma-
ternal time invested in children and focuses on estimation of the intergenerational discount
factor. Our model belongs to the literature of dynastic models.
Chapter 3 -joint with George Gayle and Limor Golan - adds the time investment in chil-
dren of father and household bargaining to the model and estimates the e¤ects of parental
time investment on the future education outcomes of children. Individuals choose fertility,
labor supply and time investment in children sequentially. Echevarria and Merlo (1999)(30)
investigates gender di¤erences in education where men and women of each generation bargain
over consumption, number of children and investment in education of their children. Our
model builds on the literature above and incorporates fertility, labor supply and transfers
decisions, made sequentially by households in a noncooperative game theoretical framework.
Chapter 3 uses data on time spent with children and measures outcomes in terms of educa-
tion, which in turns a¤ects labor market skill. Education and skills both a¤ect the childrens
earnings and marriage market outcomes stochastically. We contribute to the literature by
measuring the returns in a life-cycle dynastic model in which fertility and time spent with
children is endogenous and the di¤erent aspects of returns to investment (i.e. education,
skill and marriage market outcomes) in children are aggregated and measured in terms of
their life-time utility. We model couples decisions as a noncooperative game and solve for a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in pure strategies. We assume that each period decisions
are made in two stages. In the rst stage labor supply, investment, transfers to children are
chosen by each individual and birth decisions by the females simultaneously. In a second
stage consumption allocation is made according to the sharing rules. Therefore the valua-
tion functions of the dynastic model are not only the optimal solution to the problem given
the state variables for the individual, but they are the best response valuation functions
given the spouses choice. This requires an equilibrium choice which we assume as Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in pure strategies. We estimate a life-cycle model incorporating
fertility, labor supply and transfer decisions in which household decisions are modeled as
a non-cooperative game focusing on the e¤ects of parental time investment and parents
characteristics on childrens life-time earnings market and marriage market outcomes. We
also analyze the e¤ect of the noncooperative decisions and allocation of resources within
3
households on fertility and childrens outcomes.
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2.0 ESTIMATION OF DYNASTIC LIFECYCLE MODELS
The dynastic lifecycle model composes of two parts. The dynastic aspect of the model is
the linkage between the individuals of di¤erent generations who faces the same problem
in their own generations. The valuations of the future generations as the name dynastic
suggests can a¤ect the current generation individualschoices and preferences. The choices
are allowed to be sequential in a particular generation and this constitutes the lifecycle
aspect of the problem. In general this model, not necessarily be limited to analyze the
individuals problem across generations. Any framework tting into this description can be
estimated using the estimator developed in this chapter. However, given that the following
chapter is using the estimator developed in this chapter, the estimation framework will
be illustrated using an individual/household problem where the decisions of the current
generation individual/household can a¤ect their o¤springss outcomes, in fact can a¤ect
whether there will be o¤spring or not1.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the dynastic lifecycle model to be
estimated. The framework for the empirical implementation of the estimation is described
in Section 2. Section 3 shows the estimation of the model. Section 4 compares the new
estimator to the full solution estimator in a Monte Carlo study. Section 5 extends the results
to a model with T periods in the lifecycle. Section 6 concludes. The appendix present proofs
and implementation details.
1For instance fertility decision is part of the choices individual/household chooses.
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2.1 MODEL
The model is an overlapping generation model with endogenous consumption, labor supply,
fertility and investment in children decisions. The framework incorporates altruistic prefer-
ences, as in the Barro and Becker (1989)(9) model and builds on the literature which gen-
eralizes it (see Alvarez (1999)(5) , Enchevarria Merlo (1999)(30), Doepke (2004)(28) among
others). We begin by describing the basic intergenerational problem and then extend it to a
model which includes intra-generation life-cycle sequential decisions.
2.1.1 Individual Choices and Childrens Outcomes
An adult from generation g 2 f0; :::1g;live for T periods in which she makes decisions,
t 2 f0; 1; ::; Tg which includes the birth decision bt 2 f0; 1g; and possibly transfers to children,
dt 2 h. The transfer can be human capital or monetary transfer which a¤ects the childs
outcomes, but for simplicity we ignore bequest and transfers of assets and focus on transfers
which a¤ect the earnings potential of the child. We denote by Nt the total number of
children at the beginning of period t. Dt = fd0;::; dt 1g is a vector of transfers to children up
to period t. Denote specic choice made in a particular period t by kt where kt 2 K. Denote
by F (xt+1jxt; kt) the stochastic transition function of the state variables, conditional on last
period state variable and choice. We assume that all transition functions are known to all
individuals in all periods and generations.
An individuals time invariant characteristics are denoted by x, it includes variables such
as education, race and skill. We denote the childrens time invariant characteristics by x0.
The vector xt denotes the persistent state variables at the beginning of period t; it includes
x; Nt; Dt and belongs to the space xt 2 s(xt)
The childrens outcomes (their state variables) is a stochastic function of the parents
characteristics and her transfers. The production function of the childs characteristics is a
stochastic function which depends on the individuals total transfers over the life cycle, Ds;
where s indexes the childs year of birth. Denote the stochastic outcome function of a child
born in period s by M(x0jx;Ds):
6
We assume for simplicity that the transfer to each child is the same in the model, but it
can be extended to include a gender-specic transfer (see Enchevarria and Merlo (1999)(30)).
In our formulation, therefore, the parental time and monetary investments in childrens
education and productive skill a¤ect the probability of their educational attainment and
skills developed. In addition, it allows for the value of time investment in children to depend
on parentscharacteristics, such as education and skills through x.
We do not model explicitly the marriage decisions and do not make distinction between
di¤erent genders of the individual for the sake of making the model simple for illustration
of the estimator, such extensions are naturally included when the model is estimated using
data.
2.1.2 Preferences
Each period there are preference shocks to the utility associated with each choice, denoted
by "t = ["1t; ::; "tK ]; the shocks "kt are drawn independently across choices, periods and
generations from a distribution function F". The shocks are also conditionally independent
(of all state variables). The individual per period utility depends on the current state xt,
whether there is a birth in that period and the preference shock "kt. The discount factor
of the valuation of the childrens utility is given by N1  , where N is the total number of
children a person has at the end of the life cycle (at the end of period T ).  is the annual
discount factor. Denote by Ug the discounted expected lifetime utility of an individual in
generation g at period 0
Ug = E0
(
TX
t=0
t [u(xt; bt; dt) + "kt] + 
T
N1 
N
TX
t=0
btUg+1
)
. (2.1)
The rst element on the right hand side is the per period utility of an adult in generation
g. The per-period utility also depends on whether there is a birth in the household capturing
costs of birth, the number of children (which captures the reduction in consumption due to
the costs of raising children and possibly a utility value of having the children). The second
element is the altruistic component of the preferences; it captures the average expected
lifetime utility of a child weighted by the discount, N1  , which is assumed to be concave
in the number of children, thus 0 <  < 1.
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Assumption: The problem is stationary across generations.
Stationarity means that the state (xt; x0t 2 s(xt)) and action spaces (kt; k0t 2 K) are same
across generations and the utility and transition functions have the same functional form
across generations. Therefore given that xt = x0t, Ugt = Ug+1;t where Ugt is the period t
counterpart of equation 2.1.
Under the assumption of stationarity, we can omit the generation index g. We rst
dene the ex-ante value function V as the discounted sum of future utilities. This is the
the discounted sum of future utilities for the individual before individual-specic preference
shocks are observed and actions taken. Lets also dene by p(ktjxt) the conditional ex ante
(again before "t is observed) probability that action prole kt will be chosen conditional on
state xt. For t < T the ex ante value function can therefore be written as
V (xt) =
X
kt
p(kt = sjxt)
"
u(kt; xt) + 
X
xt+1
V (xt+1)F (xt+1jxt; kt)
#
(2.2)
+
KtX
s=1
p(kt = sjxt)E"["tjkt = s] (2.3)
where E" denotes the expectation operator with respect to the individual-specic pref-
erence shocks.
Let (kjt;xt) denote individuals continuation value net of the preference shocks (also
known as conditional valuation function) by choosing action kjt conditional on the state
variable xt. This can be written as:
(kjt;xt) = u(kjt; xt) + 
X
xt+1
V (xt+1)F (xt+1jxt; kjt). (2.4)
The choice kjt is optimal if (kjt;xt) + "jt  (kj0t;xt) + "j0t for all kj0t 6= kjt. Thus, we can
characterize the probability distribution over kjt for all j and write the conditional ex ante
choice probabilities of the choice prole:
pjt(kjtjxt) =
Z 24 Y
kjt 6=kj0it
1f(kjt;xt)  (kj0t;xt)  "jt   "j0tg
35 dF" (2.5)
where (kjt;xt)   (kj0t;xt) is the di¤erences in the ex-ante conditional valuation when
individual chooses kjt and the valuations when kj0t is chosen: Notice that the choices kjt and
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kj0t are chosen such that k maps for every period state variables (xt; "t) into choices, and we
describe the probability distribution over the choices of an individual when the strategy is
optimal.
Remember the intergenerational transition function of the persistent state variables of a
child born in period s in the parents life cycle is denoted by M(x0jxs; Ds). This function
captures the stochastic outcomes of the child in terms of the child time invariant character-
istics and the childs spouse characteristics, given the parentstime invariant characteristics
and transfers to the child. The conditional valuation function in the nal period of the life
cycle T is given by
v(kjT ;xT ) = u(kjT ; xT ) + 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N(kjT ;xT ) (2.6)
Where V N(xT ) is sum of the expected valuation over all children born up to period T
plus the valuation of a child born in period T if there is birth
V N(kjT ;xT ) 
T 1X
s=0
24bsX
x00
Vs(x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxs; Ds)
35+ bTX
x00
VT (x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxT ; DT ) (2.7)
Note that DT and Ds for s < T are both functions of kjT . In the nal period of the life
cycle, the valuation function Equation 2.6 depends on current utility, and the discounted
expected value of the childrens valuation functions. The rst element of Equation 2.7 is
the expected valuation of the existing children at the beginning of period T , which state
variables depend on past parental time input and the current period inputs. The second
element is the expected value of a child born in period T for which the gender is unknown at
the beginning of the period. Thus, this element depends on the birth decision and parental
transfer. We assume that all children become adults after period T and their state variables
are unknown until then regardless of the time of birth.
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2.1.3 Representation
We use a representation of the valuation function in terms of the models primitives and
choice probabilities which allows for the estimation of the problem in several steps. Observe
that the conditional valuation function for period t given in equation 2.4, the conditional
valuation function for period T given in 2.6 and the denition of the dynastic component
given in 2.7 can be used recursively to derive a representation for the period t conditional
valuation function as follows (proof in appendix):
(kjt;xt) = u(kjt; xt) (2.8)
+
TX
s=t+1
s t
X
xs
( X
ks
[u(ks; xs) + E"("s jks = s)]p(ks = sjxs)
!
F (xsjxt; kjt)
)
+T t
X
x0
V (x00)H(x
0
0jxt; kjt)
where F (xsjxt; kjt) is the s t transitions, H(x00jxt; kjt) is weighted generation transitions,
and V (x0) is a vector of the ex-ante valuation functions . The transition functionH(x00jxt; kjt)
can be written as recursive function of F (xt+1jxt; kjt), M(x0jx;Ds), NT , bs, p and 1  .
Dene the ex-ante conditional lifetime utility as period t, exclusion the dynastic compo-
nent as:
U(kjt; xt) = u(kjt; xt)
+
TX
s=t+1
s t
X
xs
( X
ks
[u(ks; xs) + E"("s jks = s)]p(ks = sjxs)
!
F (xsjxt; kjt)
)
Therefore we can write an alternative representation for the ex-ante value function as time
t :
V (xt) =
X
kjt

U(kjt; xt) + E"("jtjkjt; xt)

pt(kjtjxt) (2.9)
+
X
kjt
"
T t
X
x0
V (x0)H(x0jxt; kjt)
#
pt(kjtjxt)
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Equation (2.9) is satised at every state vector xt; and since the problem is stationarity
over generation at period 0 we express it as a matrix equation (proof in appendix):
V (X0) = P (X0)U(X0) + e(X0; P (X0)) + 
TP (X0)H(X0)V (X0) (2.10)
= [IS(X)   TP (X0)H(X0)] 1[P (X0)U(X0) + e(X0; P (X0))]
The terms on the right hand side of Equation 2.10 are the intergeneration and the per
period discount factors, the choice probability matrix, the intergeneration state transition
matrix, the ex-ante conditional lifetime utility, and the expected shocks. In matrix notation
V (X0) = [V (x0)]x02X0 is S(X0)  1 vector of expected discounted sum of future utility;
P (X0) is S(X0)  (S(K)  S(X0)) dimensional matrix consisting of the choice probability
p(kjx0) in rows x0 and S(X) and columns (k; x0) and (k,S(X)), zeros in rows x0 and S(X)
and columns (k; x00) and (k,S(X)) with x
0
0 6= x0; e(X0; P (X0))is the S(X0)  1 vector of
expected preference shocks with element [E"("j jkj; x)p(kjjx)]0x2X0; and IS(X) denotes the
S(X0)-dimensional identity matrix. The second line in Equation (2.10) is a direct implication
of the dominant diagonal property, which implies that the matrix [IS(X) TP (X0)H(X0)]
is invertible.
The representation of the dynastic component in equation (2.10) format allows replac-
ing the term V (x0) in equation (2.9) by the derived representation in (2.10). Therefore
this representation can be used to apply a Hotz-Miller type estimation algorithm to the
intergenerational model introduced.
2.2 ESTIMATION
The di¢ culty of estimating the model is due to the non-standard nature of the problem.
While the problem can be solved with a nested xed point algorithm2, it becomes com-
putational intensive quickly, limiting the scope of the problem that can be analyzed. The
alternative representation developed above of the continuation value of the intergenerational
2Equation (2.9) constitutes a xed point problem in V (x) and can be solved to obtain those functions
for every possible value of x. For the solution of dyanamic discrete choice probalems with NFXP, see for
instance Rust (1987) (73).
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problem enables us to derive the necessary representation and apply the Hotz and Miller
(1993)(43) estimation technique for single agent problems to the dynastic problem or a
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator (i.e Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)(1)).
Under the assumption that "s is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value then conditional
choice probabilities are related to the conditional valuation functions as follows:
log

pt(kjtjxt)
pt(k0tjxt)

= (kjt;xt)  (k0t;xt) (2.11)
for kjt 6= k0t. The i.i.d. type I extreme value assumption also implies that the conditional
expectation of the preference shocks are functions of the choice probabilities as E"("tjkjt) =
   log (pt(kjtjxt)) where  is the Euler Constant (~0:57721).
Estimation of the intergenerational model means using data on observable state variables
and the actual choices made by agents, to obtain an estimate of the parameters of the
functions: u(xt; kt; 
0
u), F (xt+1jxt; kt; 02), M(x00jxT ; kt; 03), and the discount factors 0, 0;
and 0. Let 0 = (0u; 
0; 0; 0) denote the structural parameters of interest.
Suppose we have a data set which consists of a panel of observations from a random
sample of decision makers in a particular generation g; fxit; hit; hiNt; bit : i = 1; :::; I; t =
0; Tg; and a cross-section of observations for their successors in generation g + 1 at t = 0;
fx0i0 : i = 1; :::; Ig. The representations developed in the previous section for the conditional
value functions enables us to estimate the primitives of the model.
First we note that the transition functions (F (xt+1jxt; kt; 02), M(x00jxT ; kt; 03)); and the
conditional choice probabilities pt(kjtjxt) can be estimated directly from the data. Next,
we use the relation in equation (2.11), to estimate the intergenerational model either by
pseudo-maximum likelihood or GMM.
Suppose ^2; ^3 are consistent estimates of the parameters of the transition functions andn
(p^(kjtjxlt))S(x)l=1
oK
j=1
consistent estimates of the conditional choice probabilities pt(kjtjxt)3.
3For instance, they can be estimated consistently as cell estimators from data on choices and state
variables.
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2.2.1 Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
Given that the data fxit; ait : i = 1; :::; I; t = 0; Tg were generated from the structural
model with the parameters (0; 02; 
0
3), the pseudo-likelihood estimator is dened as :
^PML = argmax

 
IX
i=1
TX
t=0
KX
kt=1
Ifkit = ktg ln[p(ktjxit; )]
!
where
p(kjtjxit; ) =
Z
If(kjt;xit; ) + "jt > (kj0t;xit; ) + "j0t 8k0jt 6= kjtgdF" (2.12)
and (kjt;xit; ) are constructed using the choice probabilities and the transition functions
which are estimated in an earlier step4.
2.2.2 GMM
Under the assumption that "s is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value then Hotz and Miller
inversion implies that
log

pt(kjtjxt)
pt(k0tjxt)

= U(kjt; xt)  U(k0t; xt) + T
X
x0
V (x0)[H(x0jxt; kjt) H(x0jxt; k0t)]
(2.13)
for kjit 6= k0it.Dene the (K   1)  1 vector it() (which is obtained by subtracting the
right hand side of equation (2.13) from the left hand side for kjt = 2; ::K) as the vector of
moment restrictions for individual i for period t as it() = (it2(); ::::; itK())
0. Dene the
[(T +1) (K  1)] 1 vector i() = (0i0(); :::; 0iT ())0 as the vector of moment restrictions
for a given individual over time. The [(T+1)(K 1)] [(T+1)(K 1)] weighting matrix
i() is dened as i()  E [i()0i()].Notice that the matrix i() is block diagonal with
diagonal elements dened as it()  Et[it()0it()], and o¤-diagonal elements that are zero
because Et[it()
0
is()] = 0 for s 6= t. The (K   1) (K   1) conditional heteroskedasticity
4In this estimation, the conditional valuation functions from the estimated choice probabilities and the
transition functions are used to obtain the choice probabilities again from the realtion given in (2.11). In
this sense it is like a one step iteration on the choice probabilities starting from the estimated consistent
ones from the data.
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matrix it() associated with the individual-specic moment restrictions it is evaluated
using an initial consistent estimator of 0. The optimal GMM estimator for  satises:
^GMM = argmin

 
1
I
IX
i=1
0i()b 1i ()i()
!
The individual moment restrictions at period t, it() are formed by introducing error in
evaluating the sample counterparts of the moment conditions. The particular element itkt,
which is the restriction for choice kt is calculated as follows:
itkt() = qkt(p^(1jxit); :::p^(Kjxit))  ((kt;xit; ; ^2; ^3)  (1; xit; ; ^2; ^3)) for kt = 2; ::Kp
where qki(p^(1jxit); :::p^(Kpjxit)) is the inverse distribution function as dened in Hotz and
Miller (1993) and it is . The estimated parameter vector ^GMM is a consistent estimator of
the true parameters 0.
2.3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE AND MONTE CARLO STUDY
In order to compare the dynamics of the model in a numerical example and examine the
performance of the estimator, we use a simple human capital investment model with in-
tergenerational transfers which has the two period model structure of Section 1. First we
generate simulated data from the model for given parameter values, compare the dynamics
and then estimate the model parameters for the generated dataset. We obtain ML estimates
using the NFXP (Nested Fixed Point) and PML (Pseudo Maximum Likelihood) estimates
using our estimator. The estimations are repeated for both algorithms for di¤erent speci-
cations of the model in terms of sample size ( i.e., for 1000, 10; 000, 20; 000, 40; 000). The
number of structural parameters estimated including the discount factors are 3.
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Table 1: State Transition Matrix
c k0 = 0 k0 = 1
0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
0:5 0:85 0:13 0:02 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0:6 0:04 0:85 0:09 0:02 0 0:1 0:9 0 0 0
0:7 0:01 0:04 0:85 0:09 0:01 0:13 0:27 0:6 0 0
0:8 0 0:01 0:05 0:85 0:09 0:01 0:11 0:28 0:6 0
0:9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0:04 0:13 0:23 0:6
2.3.1 Model Environment
The period utility function has the following linear form where agent chooses whether to
invest or not kt 2 f0; 1g in each period t 2 f0; 1g. She gets the following utilities associated
with each choice:
u(ct; kt; "t) =
8<: ct + t(0) if kt = 0(1  )ct + t(1) if kt = 1
9=;
where "t(kt) is the choice specic unobservable part of the utility and assumed to be i.i.d.
extreme value type I.
In the example environment it is assumed that each agent starts the lifecycle with a
particular consumption value ct 2 (0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8; 0:9). The transition from one state to
another is probabilistic and denoted by the transition matrix F (c1 j c0; k0), which is given
in Table 1.
The next generations starting consumption value c0 depends on the sum of the investment
decisions in the life-cycle, where D 2 (0; 1; 2). This transition is governed by the intergener-
ational transition function M(c00 j D) given in Table 2, where c00 is the consumption of the
next generation at period 0.
The transition is such that if the agent opts to invest 2 times in the life-cycle, then
she can increase the probability that the next generation will start his lifecycle with the
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Table 2: Intergenerational Transition Matrix
c00 : 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 D
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0:1 0:4 0:4 0:1 1
0 0 0:04 0:06 0:9 2
highest consumption level to 0:9. Next generations starting consumption level will be the
determined by the probabilities given in the row corresponds to the investment level. If she
invests nothing, then the next generation will have the lowest consumption value. Each row
corresponds to one of the values of D 2 (0; 1; 2) where the rst row is for the investment
D = 0.
2.3.2 Results
First we simulated the model for a given values of the parameters of the model. (; ; ) =
(0:25; 0:8; 0:95). where  is the structural parameter of interest which gives the marginal cost
of investment.  and  are the generation and time discount factors respectively. We pro-
duced samples of 1; 000, 10; 000, 20; 000, 40; 000 observations for 100 samples. For the PML
estimation, the initial consistent estimates of the CCPs are estimated nonparametrically
using the generated sample. Next we estimated the model by NFXP and PML5
Table 3 presents the result of the estimations for each specication. The mean, standard
deviation, bias and Mean Squared Error (MSE) of each parameter estimate are reported in
the respective column for each sample size. The bias and the MSE are calculated relative
to the original DGP (Data Generating Value) value of the parameter. The DGP value of
the parameter is also reported at the top left corner of summary statistics block for that
parameter. We nd that the nite sample properties of the estimators improve monotonically
5As illustrated in the estimation section, intergenerational models at the nal step can be estimated either
by PML or GMM. For this simulation study we used the PML.
16
Table 3: Simulation Results
The estimated parameter values and their computation time. Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PML) corresponds to the estimation conducted by the new estimator using
PML and ML estimation is by the Nested Fixed Point (NFXP).
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Nested Fixed Point (ML)
sample size(n) sample size(n)
 = 0:25 1,000 10,000 20,000 40,000 1,000 10,000 20,000 40,000
mean 0.24473 0.24935 0.24886 0.24881 0.22714 0.24571 0.23320 0.24477
stdev 0.04991 0.01328 0.00915 0.00668 0.04884 0.01354 0.02135 0.01019
bias -0.00527 -0.00065 -0.00114 -0.00119 -0.02286 -0.00429 -0.01680 -0.00523
MSE 0.00249 0.00017 0.00008 0.00005 0.00288 0.00020 0.00073 0.00013
 = 0:8
mean 0.80425 0.79745 0.79797 0.79673 0.77538 0.78966 0.76934 0.78855
stdev 0.11241 0.03175 0.02157 0.01587 0.09211 0.03244 0.03656 0.02063
bias 0.00425 -0.00255 -0.00203 -0.00327 -0.02462 -0.01034 -0.03066 -0.01145
MSE 0.01253 0.00100 0.00046 0.00026 0.00901 0.00115 0.00226 0.00055
 = 0:95
mean 0.94208 0.95245 0.95037 0.95136 0.93441 0.95227 0.94603 0.95027
stdev 0.06276 0.01893 0.01301 0.00934 0.05322 0.01983 0.01820 0.01236
bias -0.00792 0.00245 0.00037 0.00136 -0.01559 0.00227 -0.00397 0.00027
MSE 0.00396 0.00036 0.00017 0.00009 0.00305 0.00039 0.00034 0.00015
Avg Comp
time6
0.65 2.88 6.06 12.60 347.6 376.4 467.5 509.8
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with sample size. For the NFXP, MSE drops more than 10 times when moving from sample
size of 1; 000 to 10; 000, and drops more than 6 times when moving from n = 20; 000 to
n = 40; 000 for the parameter . The results for the discount factors are similar. The MSE
drops approximately 8 times when moving from sample size of 1; 000 to 10; 000, and drops
4 times when moving from n = 20; 000 to n = 40; 000 for the parameter . The reduction
in MSE for moving from 1; 000 to 10; 000 is 7 times, and it is 2 times when we move from
n = 20; 000 to n = 40; 000. We observe similar patterns for PML.
For the sample size of 1; 000, we obtain MSE: 0.00249 compared to 0.00288 for , 0.01253
compared to 0.00901 for  and 0.00396 compared to 0.00305 for  from the PML estimator
compared to NFXP. For the sample sizes 10; 000; 20; 000 and 40; 000, MSE obtained from
PML is lower, however the magnitudes are quite close. In terms of biases, the two estimation
algorithms are quite similar. However, the two estimation algorithm di¤ers greatly in terms
of computation times. The average computation time for the NFXP for n = 1; 000 is 347:6
seconds compared to only 0:65 seconds for the PML. The ratio is 530. For the sample size
of 40; 000 computation times are 509:8 and 12:6 respectively with a ratio of 40:47.
2.4 CONCLUSION
This paper develops a framework for estimation of life-cycle dynastic models with altruis-
tic preferences. We develop an alternative representation of the continuation value of the
intergenerational problem which enables us to estimate the model in multiple steps using
a CCP estimator. The estimator can be used to estimate a large class of dynastic models
with endogenous choices within the dynasty. Moreover the framework allows the agent in a
dynasty to sequence his choices in a nite number of periods. This estimation framework
encompasses the lifecycle dynastic models which we use in Chapter 3, however it is applica-
ble to any framework tting the description. We illustrated the estimator using a version
of a lifecycle dynastic model which is essential for the application in the following chapter.
7Calculation of the computation times does not include the cases where the NFXP algorithm fails to
converge. Especially for the sample size of 1; 000, we had to either change the convergence criteria or the
seed used in constructing the random sample in approximately 15% of the 100 replications. We encountered
similar convergence problems in sample sizes 10; 000, 20:000 and 40; 000, but less often.
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The nite sample performance of the new estimator is compared to the full solution esti-
mator (NFXP), and proves to have comparable nite sample properties while reducing the
computational time considerably. At least within the eld of labor economics as a start, the
estimator will allow the intergenerational models including generational transfers estimable
which previously could only be analyzed theoretically or numerically by calibration exercises.
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3.0 ESTIMATING THE PARENTAL RETURNS TO TIME INVESTMENT
IN CHILDREN
Full Title: Estimating the returns to parental time investment in children using
a lifecycle dynastic model
Co-authored with George-Levi Gayle and Limor Golan
Parental investment in children plays an important role in the intergenerational persis-
tence of earnings. This paper estimates the returns to parental time input in children of
parents with di¤erent characteristics and across demographic groups. In order to quantify
these returns, we develop a model of dynastic households in which altruistic individuals
choose fertility, labor supply, and time investment in children sequentially. Using data on
two generations from the PSID, this framework enables us to estimate the costs and returns
of time investment in children.
There is an extensive empirical literature showing that parental inputs and characteristics
are important determinants of childrens achievements measured by short-term outcomes
such as test scores, (see Todd and Wolpin (2003)(81), Cunha and Heckman(2008)(23) among
others) and long-term outcomes such as completed education and labor market outcomes.
For example, Berman, Foster, Rosenweig and Vashishtha (1999)(15) provide evidence on
the e¤ect of schooling of mothers in India on their childrens schooling outcomes (see also
Rosenweig and Wolpin (1994)(71) for a study using NLSY data, and Black and Devereaux
(2011)(16) for a survey on the literature). Studies in this literature can be divided into those
that use family background variables as a proxy for parental input and those that provide
direct evidence on the e¤ect of parental time investment in children on their educational
and cognitive outcomes. See Murnane, Maynard, and Ohis (1981)(64), Guryan, Hurst and
Kearney (2008)(37), Datcher-Loury (1988)(24), Houtenville and Smith Conway (2008)(45),
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Leibowitz 1974, 1977(51)(52), Hill and Sta¤ord 1980(40), Kooreman and Kapteyn 1987(49)
for examples of studies using the direct approach (see Juster and Ta¤ord (1991)(47) for a
survey on empirical evidence of time allocation).
We contribute to the literature by measuring the returns to parental time investment
in a life-cycle dynastic model in which fertility, labor supply and time spent with children
decisions are endogenous. In contrast to previous studies, the returns to investment are
measured in terms of the children life-time utility. As documented in the literature, invest-
ment in children varies substantially with family demographic characteristics and wealth.
By modeling labor supply and time investment choices, we are able to explicitly account for
the impact of households characteristics on investment in children. Specically, we account
for heterogeneity (i.e. di¤erences in education, parents skills, family structure and race) in
the costs and in the returns on parental time investment. The costs are measured in terms
of decrease in leisure and loss of labor market earnings. The returns are measured by the im-
pact of parental time input on educational attainment of children, their skills and therefore
life time earnings, as well as their marriage market outcomes; all these factors are aggregated
and measured in terms of expected life-time utility of children. In addition, there is substan-
tial variation in investment in children across household with di¤erent number of children.
By modeling fertility choices, we capture the quantity-quality trade-o¤ that households with
di¤erent demographic characteristics face.
Models of dynastic households have been traditionally used to analyze investment in
children and persistence in earnings and wealth across generations (e.g. Loury (1981)(53)
Laitner (1992)(50) and the work by Becker and Tomes (1979), (1986)(12)(13) on parental
time investment in children). A second class of dynastic models, pioneered by Becker and
Barro (1988)(8) and Barro and Becker (1989)(9) analyzes fertility decisions and transfers to
children. A small number of empirical paper quantify the returns to parental investment
in children using dynastic models. Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002)(70) studies the
returns of parental investment in childrens education, their earnings and marriage market,
Doepke and Tertilt (2009)(29) allows the returns on investment in childrens human capital
to depend on the parentseducation and Echevarria and Merlo (1999)(30) in which a dynastic
model of household bargaining gives rise to a gender gap in parental investment in education
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of the children. Our paper contributes to this literature by using data on time investment in
children and by incorporating life cycle into the Becker-Barro(9) framework, thus capturing
the dynamic aspects of labor supply decisions, time investment in children and fertility.
To the best of our knowledge only two other papers estimate the returns to parental time
investment in children in a life-cycle framework accounting for endogenous labor supply and
the opportunity cost of parental time. Kang (2010)(48) estimates a life-cycle model with
endogenous parental transfers, fertility and labor supply. In her paper parents derive utility
from the quality of children measured by their education and skill which proxy for children
wages. Similar to our model, parental time investment a¤ects the educational outcome
and a labor market skill of children. The main di¤erence from our paper is that we use
a dynastic model, thus measuring the returns in terms of children life time utility which
aggregates explicitly the labor market returns, the marriage market returns, and the utility
derived from their choices. In addition, we use data on parental time input while Kang
(2010)(48) uses labor supply data as a proxy for parental time investment and focused on
the impact of dissolution of marriage on the outcome of children. Del Boca, Flinn and
Wiswall (2010)(27) also use data on time investment in children in a life-cycle model with
endogenous labor supply and time investment in children. They measure the e¤ect of time
investment in children on unobserved quality of a child using data on test scores of children.
Our contribution is di¤erent in several respects. As discussed above, we measure the e¤ect
of parental time investment on life-time utility of children. In addition, their paper estimates
the returns using data on families with one child, thus we further contribute to this literature
by modeling fertility choice and estimate the returns and quality-quantity trade-o¤s in
households with multiple children.
In our framework individuals may be single or married, and divorce and marriage evolve
according to a stochastic process, thus individuals may live in di¤erent households over the
life cycle. In the literature, households decisions are either framed as a single decision maker
problem (this approach is pioneered by Becker (1965)(7)) or as a bargaining problem which
is either modeled as a cooperative game theoretic problem or as a non-cooperative one (e.g.,
Manser and Brown (1980)(56), McElroy and Horney (1981)(57), Chiappori (1988)(21); see
also Chiappori and Donni (2009)(22) for a recent survey on non-unitary models of household
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behavior, and Lundberg and Pollak (1996)(54) survey on non-cooperative models of alloca-
tion within households). We model household decision problem as a noncooperative game
and solve for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (for models of household allocations which are
determined as a Nash Equilibrium outcomes of a non cooperative game see Del Boca and
Flinn (1995, 2010)(25)(26), and Chen and Wolley (2001)(20)). While there is no consensus
in the literature regarding the process governing household decisions, there are several ad-
vantages to this approach in our framework. First, the Becker-Barro model is formalized as
a single decision maker dynamic optimization problem. Since we solve for a Markov Perfect
equilibrium, given any spouse strategies and characteristics, the problem reduces to a single
agent optimization problem and ts naturally in their theoretical framework as well as in
the estimation framework of dynamic games which we discuss below. At the same time, in
contrast to a unitary model approach, we are able to evaluate separately the value function
of each individual, which is an advantage as parents utility is derived from their own children
utility and not from the utility of their spouse. Second, since individuals may belong to dif-
ferent households over their life cycle, and since parents care about the utility of their own
children, formulating the optimization problem as an individual decision maker simplies the
representation and estimation of the problem relative to a household cooperative bargaining
problem is more straightforward.1
In the model, each individual from each generation lives for T periods. Over the life-cycle,
each individual makes labor supply and time investment decisions in children every period;
only females make birth decisions every period. Marriage and divorce evolve according to
a stochastic exogenous process. If there are two individuals in the households the decisions
are modeled as a non cooperative game and are made simultaneously. We do not model
explicitly bargaining over allocation of consumption within the households and assume that
each individual receives (per period) utility from his own income, the spouses income and
the stock of existing children in the household. This formulation is consistent with transfers
of income between spouses in which the size of the transfers depends on the number of
1To the best of our knowlegdge no paper has fully estimated a dynastic model with Nash bargaining
solution, divorce and marriage. Echevarria and Merlo (1999) estimate implications of dynastic model with
endogenous fertility in which household allocation is determined by a Nash bargaining solution in a model
with no divorce and marriage.
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children and earnings of each individual in the household. The total time investment in
children of both spouses over the life cycle a¤ects the childrens outcomes through several
channels. Once children become adults, their education levels are realized; the education
level is a stochastic function of the parental time input and the parents education level and
labor market skills. In addition, the skill level of a child and the education level of the
childs spouse are a stochastic function of the childs education. Thus, parental time input
and characteristics a¤ect marriage outcomes and labor market skill indirectly. Therefore,
although marriage is exogenous, parents take into account the marriage market outcomes of
the children when they make investment and birth decisions.
The Becker-Barro framework provides a natural way to aggregate the value of the dif-
ferent aspects of the outcomes of the children by measuring the returns in terms of the
discounted valuation function of the child. Time investment in children involves trading o¤
leisure and hours worked in the labor market. Earnings are the marginal productivity of the
individual and depend on the skill level, education, current level of labor supply and actual
labor market experience. Thus, the opportunity costs of time includes current earnings as
well as future loss of earnings resulting from accumulating less experience. This formula-
tion allows us to capture the heterogeneity in the opportunity costs of time of parents by
education, skill, race and gender groups. Because both the returns in terms of children out-
comes and the opportunity costs of time depend on the parents productive characteristics the
model can potentially generate decline in fertility for high earnings households (see Jones,
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2008)(46) for discussions on fertility models).
We use a partial solution estimation method which is a modied version of the multi-
stage estimation procedure developed in Gayle, Golan and Soytas (2010)(35). It uses the
assumption of stationarity across generations and the discreteness of the state space of the
dynamic programming problem to obtain an analytic representation the valuation function.
This representation is a function of the conditional choice probabilities, the transition func-
tion of the state variable, and the structural parameters of the model. The conditional
choice probabilities and the transition function are estimated in a rst stage and used in
the generation valuation representation to form the terminal value in the life-cycle prob-
lem. The life-cycle problem is then solved by backward induction to obtain the life-cycle
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valuation functions. Because the game between spouses is a complete information game, a
su¢ cient condition for the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies is super modularity.
Our game is super modular if there are strategic complementarities in time investment of
parents or outcome of parental time investment is independent of the spouses investment.
An additional advantage of using a multiple step estimation approach is that it allows us to
estimate the childrens education production function parameters separately, using a Three
Stage Least Square method, and verify that the conditions for existence of equilibrium are
satised. We then form moment conditions from the best response functions and estimate
it in a third step. Finally to reduce the computational burden of the backward induction
in the life-cycle problem we use the forward simulation technique developed in Hotz, Miller,
Sanders and Smith (1994)(44), and estimate the remaining structural parameters using Gen-
eralized Methods of Moment (GMM) estimator. To the best of our knowledge this is rst
paper to estimate a dynamic complete information game.
Our preliminary analysis shows that parental investment in children varies signicantly
across gender, race, education levels, and household composition. It also shows that after
controlling for gender, education levels, and household composition, the di¤erences across
race are signicantly reduced. We nd that both maternal and paternal time investment
increase the likelihood of higher educational outcome of their children. However, the impact
is complementary; fatherstime investment increases the probability of graduating from high
school and getting some college education while motherstime increases the probability of
achieving a college degree. The estimates of the education production-function show that
girls have a higher likelihood than boys of achieving high levels of education, and that
blacks have higher variance than whites in their educational outcomes, after controlling for
parental inputs. Specically, blacks have a higher probability of not completing high school
than whites, however, they also have a higher probability of graduating from college than
whites.
We then quantify the returns to parental time investment using the e¤ect of an increase
in time input on the change in the valuation function of the child. We nd that the overall
returns to fatherstime investment is only 40% that of motherstime investment for white.
We nd the black mothers time investment is insignicant and the e¤ect of time investment
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is only important for white mothers. Although both parents input improve the educational
attainment of children, maternal time investment increases the probability of a child grad-
uating from college, and a college degree increases the returns in both the labor and the
marriage markets. Similar to Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2002)(70), we nd that both
parents education levels, all else equal, increases the outcomes of the children but the e¤ect of
fatherseducation is higher than the e¤ect of motherseducation. There are race di¤erences
in the returns to paternal time investment and this interacts with the gender composition of
the children in the household for both black and white fathers. One reason for insignicant
maternal time investment by blacks may be the family structure. There is a signicantly
higher proportion of black single mothers than white single mothers and the opportunity
costs of time for single mothers are higher than the opportunity costs of married mothers.
Finally the returns to maternal time investment is independent of the gender of the child,
whereas paternal time favors girls. This implies that fathers act in a achievement maximiz-
ing manner, favoring high ability children in the family. Since girls already have a higher
likelihood of achieving high education outcome than boys, fathers seems to investment more
time in girls than in boys as the number of children increases.
Our ndings suggest a signicant quality-quantity trade-o¤. This trade-o¤ is measured in
terms of the rate of increase in utility of parents versus the rate of the decline in the average
life time utility per child resulting from having an additional child. The level of investment
per child is smaller the larger the number of children, thus, this decline in the per child
investment is driven by the time constraint and the opportunity costs of time and not by
the properties of the production function technology of children. The negative relationship
between income (education) and fertility is therefore explained by the higher opportunity cost
of time of educated parents in terms of forgone earnings. We nd similar quality-quantity
trade-o¤ for blacks and whites after controlling for education and parental inputs. Therefore
the black-white gap seems to be related to the factors as education and the time investment
of the parents when the returns are measured as the aggregate measure of utilities of future
generations. This explanation is in line with Chiswick (1988)(19) evidence for quantity-
quality trade-o¤; he concludes that family decisions and intergenerational transfers may
play a big role in the observed race gap in achievements and earnings. Neal (2006)(65)
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provides evidence for the importance of these factors in the observed Black-White skill gap
and its trends. Our direct estimates support this hypothesis.
Interestingly, we nd that females have higher valuation functions (i.e. female child value
is higher than that of a male child). Despite the fact that females earn less than men with the
same productive characteristics, females are more likely to obtain higher levels of education
than males, given equal amount of parental inputs and education is highly compensated in
the labor market. However, even given the same level of education the valuation function of
females are higher than males; this is because married females receive signicant transfers
from their husbands income. This ndings can be explained by the fact than females are
endowed with the birth decisions and males value children, but cannot make decisions to have
them. This explanation is consistent with Echevarria and Merlo (1999)(30) which nds that
transfers made within households increase the returns to parental investment in girls, and
that the gender gap in education outcome of children is smaller when considering endogenous
investment of parents in children.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and variable
construction. It also presents our preliminary analysis. Section 3 presents our theoretical
model. Section 4 presents our estimation technique and empirical implementation. Section
5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 presents our measures of the quality-quantity
trade-o¤ and the return to parental time investment. Section 7 summaries our ndings and
concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
3.1 DATA
We used data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID). We selected individuals from 1968 to 1996 by setting the individual level
variables "Relationship to Head" to head or wife or son or daughter. We dropped all sons or
daughters if they are younger than 17 years of age. This initial selection produces a sample
of 12,051 and 17,744 males and females respectively; these individuals were observed for at
least one year during our sample period. Our main sample contains 423,631 individual-year
observations.
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We only kept white and black individuals between the ages of 17 and 55 in our sample.
The earnings equation requires the knowledge of past 4 participation decisions in the labor
market. This immediately eliminates individuals with less than 5 years of sequential obser-
vations. This reduces the number of individual-year observations to 139,827. In order to
keep track of parental time investment throughout a childs early life we dropped parents
we only observed after their children are older than 16 years of age. We also dropped parents
with missing observations during the rst 16 years of their childrens life. Furthermore, if
there are missing observations on the spouse of a mare individual then that individual is
dropped from our sample.
The PSID measures annual hours of housework for each individual, however, it does
not provide data on time parents spend on child care. This variable is estimated using
a variation of the approach use in the previous literature. Example of papers using this
approach can be found in Hill and Sta¤ord (1980)(40), Leibowitz (1974)(51), and Datcher-
Loury (1988)(24). Hours with children are computed as the deviation of housework hours
in a particular year from the average housework hours of married individuals with no child
by gender and education. Negative values are set to zero and child care hours are also set
to zero for individuals with no children.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for our sample; Column (1) summarizes the
overall sample, Column (2) focuses on the parents, and Column (3) summarizes the char-
acteristics of the their children. It shows that the rst generation is on average 7 years
older than the second generation in our sample. As a consequence a higher proportion are
married in the rst generation relative to the second generation. The male-female ratio is
similar across generations (about 55 percent female), however, our sample contains a higher
proportion of blacks in the second generation that in the rst generation (about 29 percent
in the second and 20 percent in the rst generation). This higher proportion of blacks in the
second generation is due to the higher fertility rate among blacks in our sample. There are
no signicant di¤erences across generations in the years of completed education. As would
be expected, because on average the second generation in our sample is younger that the rst
generation in our sample, the rst generation has higher number of children, annual labor
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Variable N Mean N Mean N Mean
Female 115,280 0.545 86,302 0.552 28,978 0.522
Black 115,280 0.223 86,302 0.202 28,978 0.286
Married 115,280 0.381 86,302 0.465 28,978 0.131
Age 115,280 26.155 86,302 27.968 28,978 20.756
(7.699) (7.872) (3.511)
Education 115,280 13.438 86,302 13.516 28,978 13.209
(2.103) (2.138) (1.981)
Number of children 115,280 0.616 86,302 (0.766) 28,978 0.167
(0.961) (1.028) (0.507)
Annual labor income 114,871 16,115 86,137 19,552 28,734 5,811
(24,622) (26,273) (14,591)
Annual labor market hours 114,899 915 86,185 1078 28,714 424
(1041) (1051) (841)
Annual housework hours 66,573 714 58,564 (724) 8,009 641
(578) 585 (524)
Annual time spent
on children
115,249 191 86,275 234 28,974 63.584
(432) (468) (259)
Number of individuals 12,318 6,813 5,505
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and include individuals surveyed between 1968 and 1997. Column (1) contains the summary statistics for
the full sample; column (2) contains the summary statistics for the parents generation; column (3) contains
the summary statistics of the o¤ spring of the parents in column (2). Annual labor income is measured in
2005 dollars. Education measures year of completed education. There are less observations for annual
housework hours than time spent on children because single individuals with no child are coded as missing
for housework hours but by denition are set to zero for time spent on children.
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income, labor market hours, housework hours, and time spent with children. Our second
generation sample does span the same age range, 17 to 55, as our rst sample.
3.1.1 Preliminary Analysis
Many studies have analyzed various dimensions of the relationship between motherstime
with children and childrens outcomes (see Hill and Sta¤ord (1980)(40), Leibowitz (1974)(51),
Datcher-Loury (1988)(24), among others). Few studies, however, have analyzed the e¤ect of
fatherstime with children or household labor market decisions on their childrens subsequent
outcomes. In this section we document some of these empirical regularities as a way of
motivating and clarifying our modelling choices.
3.1.1.1 The Relationship between Child Care Time and Household Composition
Figure 1 presents the kernel estimates of the density of hours spent with children by marital
status, gender, and race. It shows that females provide signicantly more hours than males,
conrming the well documented specialization by gender in home production. The upper left
hand panel shows that over the nonzero range, the distribution of hours spent with children
does not di¤er signicantly by marital status, however, there is a higher incidence of zero
hours spent with children for married parents than for single parents. A closer look at the
middle and bottom left hand panels shows that this higher incidence of zero hours with
children for married parents versus single parents is mostly is due to the signicantly higher
incidence of zero hours among married versus single male parents. The middle left hand
panel shows that the distribution, for time investment in children greater than 160 hours
per annum, is similar across marital status for male parents. Below 160 hours per annum,
married male parents are less likely to provide time with children than single male parents.
Married female parents are more likely to provide high hours and are less likely to provide
low hours than single female parents.
The right hand panels of Figure 1 present the distributions of child care hours by race
and gender; they show that there are little to no di¤erences in the distribution of hours
spent with children of black and white parents. If anything, blacks provide more hours than
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whites. The pattern for the overall distribution by race is repeated for males, however, white
females provide more hours than their black counterparts. This could be due to the higher
incidence single mothers among blacks than whites; this is demonstrated by the similarity
between the whites versus blacksdistributions and married versus single distributions for
mothers. Figure 2 presents the kernel estimates of the density of hours invested in children
by own education, spouse education, number children, and gender. The top panels show that
fathers hours are increasing with fatherseducation, with college educated fathers having the
highest likelihood of providing time with children. However, the distributions of hours of
mothers are not monotone in mothers education; a mother with less than a high school
education is most likely to provide high hours while a mother with some college education is
least likely to provide high hours. The patterns observed for own education are repeated for
spouse education, with the di¤erences that a mother whose spouse has a college education
is the least likely to provide high hours. This highlights the assortative mating on education
in the marriage market. The bottom panels of Figure 2 present the distributions by the
number children and show that hours provided by both fathers and mothers are increasing
in the number of children.
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3.1.1.2 The Relationship between Child Care Time and Labor Market Time
Time not spent taking care of children can either be spent working in the labor market or
on leisure; given a xed hours endowment day, it su¢ ces to analyze the relationship between
time investment in children and labor market time. Figure 3 presents the kernel estimate of
the densities of hours spent with children by labor supply, education, and gender. The top
panels of Figure 3 show that for both fathers there is a negative relationship between hours
worked and hours spent with children. This may indicate some degree of substitutability
between time with children hours provided by parents and market purchased child care. The
second panels from the top of Figure 3 show that among parents who are not currently
employed college graduates are more likely to spend more hours with children. Parents who
did not complete high school and those that have some college education but not a college
degree are the least likely to spent time with children on child when they are not working.
Surprisingly, the behavior of parents with some college is similar to those with less than
high school; this may reect some selection on unobservable which are correlated with not
completing a given level of education. We seek to capture these unobserved traits by using
individual specic e¤ects that are correlated with observed individual specic variable such
as the level of completed education. The third panels from the top show that this pattern
is repeated for parents that are currently working part-time. The bottom panels of Figure
3 show that these patterns are very di¤erent for parents that are working full-time in the
labor market. For fathers that are working full-time in the labor market there are virtually
no di¤erences by education groups; however, for mother working full-time those with less
than high school education are more likely to spend a high number of hours with children.
On the other hand, mothers that have at least a college degree are the least likely to spend
a large amount of hours with children when they are working full-time. This may reect
di¤erences in the type of full-time jobs perform by mother with at least a college education
and mothers with less education. Nevertheless, these empirical ndings demonstrate the
interplay between time investment in children, gender, education, household composition,
and the labor market hours.
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Figure 1: Parental Time Densities by Marital Status, Gender and Race
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Figure 2: Parental Time Densities by Own Education, Spouses Education and Number of
Children
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Figure 3: Parental Time Densities by Labor Supply and Education
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3.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework builds on Becker and Barro (1989)(9) and the literature which
generalizes it (see Alvarez (1999)(5), Doepke (2005)(28) among others). Our model is a
dynastic model with altruistic preferences in which each individual in a generation makes
consumption, fertility, time spend with children and labor supply decisions sequentially over
the life cycle. Households may consist of individuals or a couple making decisions. We model
couples decisions as a noncooperative game and solve for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE) in pure strategies. We do not model household formation and dissolution as choices;
instead, marriage and divorce and assumed to evolve stochastically, but the process depends
on the individual and household time invariant as well as endogenous characteristics (such as
number of children, human capital accumulated with experience etc.). Individuals therefore,
take into account the e¤ect of choices on probability of marriage and divorce, thus these
variables are endogenous in a predetermined sense.
There are two types of individuals, female and male denoted by  = f;m; respectively.
Adults live for T periods in which they make decisions, t 2 f0; 1; ::; Tg. An adult from
generation g 2 f0; :::1gmakes choices of consumption ct, and discrete labor supply decision
ht 2 h (e.g. not work, part time, full time), time spent with children dt 2 h and a birth
decision bt 2 f0; 1g. We assume that only females make the birth decision, thus we omit the
gender subscript. The gender dummy of a child born in period t is denoted by It; it takes
the value 1 if the child is of gender  and 0 otherwise. We denote the vector of labor supply
choice in period t by Ht = fh0;::; ht 1g; to capture the labor market experience of the
individual at the beginning of the period. We denote by Nt the total number of children at
the beginning of period t. We assume that if there is a birth in the household in period t the
child belongs to both spouses in the household, however, since individuals may divorce and
remarry or have children when single (female only), the number of children of each spouse in
the household may be di¤erent. Dt = fd0;::; dt 1g is a vector of time invested in each of
spouse own children up to period t. An individual time invariant characteristics are denoted
by x; it includes variables such as education, race and a skill. We denote the spouse of
an individual by  , thus x  is the spouses characteristics, if the individual is married.
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The vector xt denotes the persistent state variables at the beginning of period t; it includes
x; Nt; Ht; Dt as well as the gender dummies of each child (I0:::It) and the total time
invested in each child by the other parent (if the childs parent is the current spouse it is
D t).
The time invariant state variables of a child of spouse  is denoted by x0; the production
function of the childs characteristics is a stochastic function which depends on the parents
total input of time over the life cycle, Ds; where s indexes the childs year of birth. Denote
the stochastic outcome function of a child born in period s by m(x0jxf ; xm; Ds):
The stochastic time invariant state variables of the child also depend on the parents
time invariant traits such as education and skill level. Although we do not model explicitly
the marriage decisions, marriage outcomes depend stochastically on the individual charac-
teristics; thus the childs spouse characteristics depend stochastically on the childs charac-
teristics: G(x0 jx0).
We assume that the earnings of individuals depend on their time invariant characteristic,
such as education and a given skill endowment, the human capital accumulated with expe-
rience of working full time and part time in the past, and current level of labor supply. The
earnings function in periods t is given by wt(x; Ht 1; ht). Earnings of individuals with
the same productive characteristics depend on their other time invariant characteristics such
as gender and race capturing labor market discrimination.
Assume that each period there are preference shocks to the utility associated with each
choice, denoted by "t = ["1t; ::; "tK ]; the shocks "kt are drawn independently across
choices, periods, individuals and generations from a distribution function F". The shocks
are also conditionally independent (of all state variables). The individual per period utility
depends on their current earnings and their spouses current earning, leisure, whether there
is a birth in that period and the preference shock "kt. The discount factor of the valuation
of the childrens utility is given by N1  , where N is the total number of children a person
has at the end of the life cycle.  is the annual discount factor. Denote by Ug the discounted
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expected lifetime utility of an individual in generation g at period 0
Ug = E0(
TX
t=0
t [u(wt; w t; x; bt; ht; dt;Nt) + "kt] + 
T
N1 
N
TX
t=0
bt
 X

ItUg+1
!
)
(3.1)
The rst element on the right hand side is the per period utility of an adult in gener-
ation g of gender : We do not formally model bargaining and allocation of consumption
within the households, and assume that the per period utility from consumption depends on
the current earning, the spouses current earnings and number of children; our formulation
is consistent with no borrowing or saving and transfers between spouses. Specically, the
consumption of spouses depend on their own labor market income and labor supply, their
spouses labor supply and income and on the number of children. Alternatively, if the utility
in separable and linear in consumption, the formulation is consistent with wealth maximiza-
tion and transfers between spouses (in addition to utility from leisure and children). We
further discuss the functional form assumptions in Section 4: The per-period utility also
depends on whether there is a birth in the household capturing costs of birth, the number of
children (which captures the reduction in consumption due to the costs of raising children
and possibly a utility value of having the children) and leisure. Because the labor supply
and time spent with children choices are discrete, the current level of leisure is fully captured
by ht; dt: The second element is the altruistic component of the preferences; it captures
the average expected lifetime utility of a child weighted by the discount, N1  , which is
assumed to be concave in the number of children, thus 0 <  < 1: Our formulation cap-
tures several di¤erences between men and women, therefore, the expected utility of a child
depends on the childs gender. There per-period utility of females and males may di¤er
when there is birth, and labor market earnings of males and females with the same level of
skills, education and experience may di¤er due to discrimination, which we assume to be
exogenous. Furthermore, utility from own earnings and the spouses earnings, may di¤er by
gender, capturing di¤erences in allocation of consumption within households.
Let xt = (xft; xmt) denote the persistent state variables of the spouses in the household
and "t = ("ft;"mt) the vectors of preference shocks of both spouses. Denote specic choices
made in each period by kjt and the spouses choices are denoted by k it:The vector of
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choices made by both spouses in the household in period t is denoted by kjit = (kjt; k it)
with j denoting the choices of individual  and i denoting the choices of their spouse . Also
denote by F (xt+1jxt; kjit) the stochastic transition function of the state variables, conditional
on last period household state variables and choices. We assume that all transition functions
are known to all individuals in all periods and generations. At the beginning of the period, all
the household state variables are common knowledge, including the individual taste shocks.
We assume that each period decisions are made in two stages. In the rst stage labor
supply,investment, transfers to children are chosen by each individual, and birth decisions by
the female simultaneously. In a second stage consumption allocation is made. In a second
stage consumption allocation is made according to the sharing rules.
A Markov strategy prole for  in the game is a vector k = [k0(xt; "t); :; kT (xT ; "T )],
which describes the action for all possible household states variables xt; "t in every period,
where kft(xt; "t) = (dft(xt; "t); hft(xt; "t); bt(xt; "t)) and kmt(xt; "t) = (dmt(xt; "t); hmt(xt; "t))
are the period t decisions in every state . Note that kt(xt; "t) is a mapping from all
possible states to K possible combination of choices every period: k0; ::; kK : Let kt =
(kt(xt; "t); k t(xt; "t)) denote an element t in a specic strategy prole of both spouses.
The strategy prole maps the state variables into choices of both spouses, where a specic
set of choices kjit = (kjt; k it).
Under the assumption of stationarity, we omit the generation index g:We rst dene the
ex-ante value function V as the discounted sum of future utilities. This is the the discounted
sum of future utilities for household member  before individual-specic preference shocks
are observed and actions taken. Lets also dene by p(ktjxt) the conditional ex ante (again
before "t is observed) probability that household action prole kt will be chosen conditional
on state xt. For t < T the ex ante value function can therefore be written as
V(xt) =
X
kt
p(kt = sjxt)
"
u(k; xt) + 
X
xt+1
V(xt+1)F (xt+1jxt; kt)
#
(3.2)
+
KtX
s=1
E"["tjkt = s]p(kt = sjxt)
where E" denotes the expectation operator with respect to the individual-specic preference
shocks.
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Let (kjit;xt) denote individual s best response continuation value net of the prefer-
ence shocks playing strategy kjt conditional on the spouse playing strategy k it. This can
be written as:
(kjit;xt) = u(kjit; xt) + 
X
xt+1
V(xt+1)F (xt+1jxt; kjit). (3.3)
Recall that a vector of choices for a household is given by kjit = (kjt; k it). Thus,
given a spouse strategy k it a vector of choice kjt is optimal if (kjt; k it;xt) + "jt 
(kj0t; k it;xt) + "j0t for kj0t. Thus, we can characterize the probability distribution over
kjt for all j and write the conditional ex ante choice probabilities of the choice prole given
a spouses strategy prole:
pjt(kjtjk it; xt) =
Z 24 Y
kjt 6=kj0it
1f(kjit;xt)  (kj0it;xt)  "jt   "j0tg
35 dF" (3.4)
where (kjit;xt)   (k0it;xt) is the di¤erences in the ex-ante conditional valuation when
individual  chooses kjt and the valuations when kj0t is chosen given that the spouse
chooses k it: Notice that the choices kjt and kj0t are chosen according to the strategy k
which maps for every period state variables (xt; "t) into choices, and given a spouse choices,
we describe the probability distribution over the choices of an individual when the strategy
is optimal. Because the conditional independence of the shocks, the household strategies
probabilities are given by
p(ktjxt+1) = pjt(kjtjk it; xt) p it(k itjxt). (3.5)
Dene the intergenerational transition function of the persistent state variables of a child
born in period s in the parents life cycle by
M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds)  m(x0jxf ; xm; Ds)G(x0 jx0).
This function captures the stochastic outcomes of the child in terms of the child time invari-
ant characteristics and the childs spouse characteristics, given the parentstime invariant
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characteristics and time investment in the child. The ex-ante conditional best response
function net of the preference shock in the nal period of the life cycle T is given by
v(kjiT ;xT ) = u(kjiT ; xT ) + 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N(kjiT ;xT ) (3.6)
Where V N(xT ) is sum of the expected valuation over all children born up to period T
plus the valuation of a child born in period T if there is birth
V N(kjiT ;xT ) 
T 1X
s=0
24bsX

Is
X
x00
Vs(x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxf ; xm; Ds)
35 (3.7)
+bT
X

p
X
x00
VT (x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxf ; xm; DT )
Note that DT and Ds for s < T are both functions of kjiT . In the nal period of the life
cycle, the valuation function (Equation 3.6) depends on current utility, and the discounted
expected value of the childrens valuation functions. The rst element of Equation 3.7 is the
expected valuation of the existing children at the beginning of period T , which state variables
depend on past parental time input and the current period inputs. The second element is the
expected value of a child born in period T for which the gender is unknown at the beginning
of the period. Thus, this element depends on the birth decision and parental time input. We
assume that all children become adults after period T and their state variables are unknown
until then regardless of the time of birth.
We solve for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game; restricting attention to pure
strategies and do not consider mixed strategies.
Denition 1 (Markov perfect equilbrium). A strategy prole k is said to be a Markov
perfect equilibrium if for any t  T , 2 fm:fg, and (xt; "t) 2 (X;RKf+Km);
1. (kjit;xt) + "jt  (k0j0iT ;xt) + "j0t ;
2. all players use Markovian Strategies
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In general a pure strategy Markovian perfect equilibrium for complete information sto-
chastic games may not exist, however, we imposed su¢ cient conditions on the primitives of
our game and show that there exist at least one pure strategies Markov perfect equilibrium.
To show this results, we use some of the properties and denitions of supermodular games on
lattice theory (see Milgrom and Roberts(1990)(59), Milgrom and Shannon (1994)(60), and
Tokis(1998)(82) for examples these properties). A binary relation  on a non-empty set is a
partial order if it is reexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. A partially ordered set is said
to be a lattice if for any two elements the supremum and inmum are elements of the set. A
2 person game is said to be supermodular if the set of actions for each player  is a compact
lattice and the payo¤ function is supermodular in k for xed k  and satises increasing
di¤erences in (k; k ). Following Watanabe and Yamashita (2010)(83), if the continuation
values in every period and state satisfy the conditions below, the game is supermodular and
there exists a pure strategies Markov perfect equilibrium. Following the convention, we use
_ to denote the supremum of two elements and ^ to denote the inmum of two elements.
Condition 1 (S). (kt; k t; xt) is supermodular in kt for any xt and k t if
(k
0
t_kt; k t; xt)+(k0t^kt; k t; xt)  (k0t; k t; xt)+(kt; k t; xt) (3.8)
for all (k0t; kt).
Condition 2 (ID). (kt; k t; xt) has increasing di¤erences in (k; k ) for any xt if
(k
0
t; k
0
 t; xt)  (kt; k0 t; xt)  (k0t; k t; xt)  (kt; k t; xt) (3.9)
for all k0t  kt and k0 t  k t.
Watanabe and Yamashita (2010)(83) provide su¢ cient conditions on the stochastic tran-
sitions functions and the per period utility for the these exist a pure strategy Markov perfect
equilibrium. These conditions impose restrictions on the functional forms of the per period
utility sharing rules, wage functions, value of kids, and the return investment in children. In
the implementation section we discuss these restrictions further once the functional of these
primitives are specied and provide a proof.
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3.3 ESTIMATION
We use a representation of the valuation function in terms of the models primitives and
choice probabilities which allows for the estimation of the problem in several steps (see Gayle,
Golan, Soytas (2011)(35), details on the estimation of discrete choice dynastic models). The
estimator accommodates the multiple equilibria issue. The di¢ culty of estimating the model
is due to the non-standard nature of the problem. While the problem can be solved with
a nested xed point algorithm, it becomes computational intensive quickly, limiting the
scope of the problem that can be analyzed. The alternative representation developed of
the continuation value of the intergenerational problem enables us to derive the necessary
representation and apply the Hotz and Miller (1993)(43)estimation technique for single agent
problems to the dynastic problem. We use the estimator developed in a companion paper
Gayle, Golan, Soytas (2011)(35)beginning with the following representation of the problem,
(kjit;xt) = u(kjit; xt)
+
TX
s=t+1
s t
X
xs
( X
ks
[u(ks; xs) + E"("s jks = s)]p(ks = sjxs)
!
F (xsjxt; kjit)
)
+T t
X
x0
V (x00)H(x
0
0jxt; kjit) (3.10)
where F (xsjxt; kjit) is the s   t transitions, H(x00jxt; kjit) is weighted generation transi-
tions, and V (x0) (= [Vf (x0); Vm(x0)]0) is a vector of the ex-ante . The transition function
H(x00jxt; kjit) can write as recursive function of F (xt+1jxt; kjit),M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds), NT , bs, p
and 1  . Dene the ex-ante conditional lifetime utility as period t, exclusion the dynastic
component as:
U(kjit; xt) = u(kjit; xt)
+
TX
s=t+1
s t
X
xs
( X
ks
[u(ks; xs) + E"("s jks = s)]p(ks = sjxs)
!
F (xsjxt; kjit)
)
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Therefore we can write an alternative representation for the ex-ante value function as time
t :
V(xt) =
X
k it
8<:p(k itjxt)X
kjt

U(kjit; xt) + E"("jtjkjit; xt)

pt(kjitjxt)
9=; (3.11)
+
X
k it
8<:p(k itjxt)X
kjt
"
T t
X
x0
V (x0)H(x0jxt; kjit)
#
pt(kjitjxt)
9=;
Equation (3.11) is satised at every state vector xt; and since the problem is stationarity
over generation at period 0 we express it as a matrix equation:
V (X0) = P (X0)U(X0) + e(X0; P (X0)) + 
TP (X0)H(X0)V (X0)
= [I2S(X)   TP (X0)H(X0)] 1[P (X0)U(X0) + e(X0; P (X0))] (3.12)
The terms on the right hand side of Equation 3.12 are the intergeneration and the per
period discount factors, the household choice probability matrix, the intergeneration state
transition matrix, the ex-ante conditional lifetime utility, and the expected purveyances
shocks. In matrix notation V (X0) = [V (x0)]x02X0 is 2S(X0)1 vector of expected discounted
sum of future utility; P (X0) is 2S(X0)  (S(K)  2S(X0)) dimensional matrix consisting of
the household choice probability p(kjx0) in rows x0 and S(X)+x0 and columns (k; x0) and
(k,S(X)+x0), zeros in rows x0 and S(X)+x0 and columns (k; x00) and (k,S(X)+x
0
0) with
x00 6= x0; e(X0; P (X0))is the 2S(X0)  1 vector of expected preference shocks with element
[
P
k fi E"("fj jkji; x)p(kfjijx)p(k fijx);
P
k mi E"("mj jkji; x)p(kmjijxt)p(k mijxt)]0x2X0; and
I2S(X) denotes the 2S(X0)-dimensional identity matrix. The second line in Equation (3.12)
is a direct implication of the dominant diagonal property, which implies that the matrix
[I2S(X)   TP (X0)H(X0)] is invertible.
Under the assumption that "s is distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value then Hotz and
Miller (1993)(43), inversion implies that
log

pjt(kjtjk it; xt)
pjt(k0tjk it; xt)

= (3.13)
U(kjit; xt)  U(k0it; xt)
+T
X
x0
V (x0)[H(x0jxt; kjit) H(x0jxt; k0it)]
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for  2 ff;mg; kjit 6= k0it. Using equation (3.13) we then use a simulated method of moment
estimation techniques developed in Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994)(44). In the rst
step we estimate the transition functions and conditional best response probabilities from
the data. Starting at age seventeen we use the estimate in the rst step to simulate lifetime
paths for each value of the state space. Using the formulate in equation (3.12), we compute
and estimate of V (X0) from the simulated data. Similarly we simulated paths for each value
of the state space at age greater seventeen which to obtain and estimate of the for Next we
simulate of U(kjit; xt). Using the estimates of the conditional best response probabilities,
transition functions, V (X0), and U(kjit; xt); we form an empirical counterpart to equation
(3.13) and estimate the parameters of our model using a 2-step GMM estimator.
3.3.1 Empirical Implementation
We describe the choice set specications, functional forms of model which we estimate and
discuss existence and implications.
3.3.1.1 Choice sets We set the number of periods in each generation T = 39 and
measure the individuals age where t = 0 is age 17. Below we summarize the decision process
of males and females for possible choice combinations. Dene an indicator variable Ikt
where Ikt = 1 if the action kt is chosen and Ikt = 0 otherwise. Females have 16 mutually
exclusive choices each includes a level of labor market time, time spent with children and a
birth decision. Thus, with 3 levels of labor supply corresponding to no work, part time work,
and full time work (i.e. hft 2 f0; 1; 2g). These levels are dened using the 40 hours week; an
individual working less three hours per week is classied as not working, individuals working
between 3 and 20 hours per week are classied as working part time, while individuals
working more than 20 hours per week are classied as working full time. There are 3 levels
of parental time with kids corresponding to no time, low time, and high time. To control for
the fact female spends signicantly more time with kids than male we used a gender specic
categorization. We used the 50th percentile of the distribution of parental time with kids as
the threshold for low versus high parental time with children, thus a parent spending parent
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spending greater than zero but less than the 50th percentile is classied as spending low
time with kids and greater or equal to the 50 percentile is classied as spend high time with
kids (i.e. dt 2 f0; 1; 2g). Finally, birth is a binary variable equal one of the mother give
birth child in that year and zero otherwise (i.e. bt 2 f0; 1g): Table 5 presents the summary
of these 16 mutually exclusive choices.
Males have 9 mutually exclusive choices since they do not have a birth decision; there
labor market and parental time decisions dened the same way as female except that the
parental time threshold is dened using the male distribution of parental time hours. The
second panel in Table 3 presents the summary of the males choice set. Let sets HP and
HF index the choices that involve working part time and full time in the labor market
respectively and let H be the choice set for each gender .
Individual utility is a function of consumption, leisure and number of children which
a¤ects consumption. The per period utility of an individual is composed of two parts; utility
from own and spouses current income and number of children and the utility from leisure.
We assume the following functional forms for the utility from income for a married (or for
cohabitation) individual in period t
u1t = wt
X
kt s2HF[HP
Ikt s + 0w t
X
kt s2HF [HP 
I kt s; + N(N17t + bt) (3.14)
where N17t is the e¤ective number of children less than 17 years old. The per-period utility
from income for a single individual is
u1t = wt
X
kt s2HF[HP
Ikt s + N(N17t + bt) (3.15)
This formulation is consistent with each spouse consuming a share of their income net
of their share of costs of children and a transfer from the spouse. Assuming no borrowing
and saving, one can restrict the coe¢ cients on the income, spouses income and number of
children so that the total value of consumption equals the total household income net of
costs of children and the per-period budget constraint is satised. However, since we do not
have data on consumption or costs of children, the coe¢ cients on the number of children
also captures non-pecuniary utility from children and cannot be identied separately from
the monetary costs of raising children.
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Table 5: Discrete Choice Set of Structural Model
Decisions
Choice Labor Market Work Child Birth Child Care Hours
Female
1 None None None
2 Part time None None
3 Full Time None None
4 Full Time Yes None
5 None None Low
6 Part Time None Low
7 Full Time None Low
8 None Yes Low
9 Part Time Yes Low
10 Full Time Yes Low
11 None None High
12 Part Time None High
13 Full Time None High
14 None Yes High
15 Part Time Yes High
16 Full Time Yes High
Male
1 None NA None
2 Part Time NA None
3 Full Time NA None
4 None NA Low
5 Part Time NA Low
6 Full Time NA Low
7 None NA High
8 Part Time NA High
9 Full Time NA High
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We assume that the preferences are additive in consumption and leisure. We there dened
the per period disutility from working for each gender as
u2t =
X
kt2H
ktIkt (3.16)
where kt are the coe¢ cients associated with each choice, thus capturing the disutility from
any combination of time spent with children and at work, thus capturing the value of leisure.
For females, the disutility from working and spending time with children also depends on
whether there is a birth or not in that period, whereas for males, the only e¤ect of birth is
through the e¤ect of an additional child mN . For notational ease we omit age, education,
and race but all the above utility parameters are allowed to vary by these characteristics.
3.3.1.2 Labor Market Earnings Individuals earnings depend on his/her characteris-
tics, xt: Let zt, be a subset of xt; which includes age, age squared and Ed; an education
dummy variables indicating whether the individual has high school, some college or college
(or more) education interacted with age respectively2. Let  be the individual specic abil-
ity which is assumed to be correlated with the individual specic time invariant observed
characteristics.. Earnings are assumed to be the marginal productivity of workers, and is
assumed to be exogenous, linear additive and separable across individuals in the economy.
The earnings equations for female and male are given by:
wt = exp(0zt +
X
s=0
pt;s
X
kt s2HP
Ikt s +
X
s=1
ft;s
X
kt s2HFm
Ikt s + ) (3.17)
where the earnings equation depends on experience accumulated while working part time
and full time, and the current level of labor supply. We assume  = 4, and the depreciation
and di¤erent values of human capital accumulated while working part-time and full time as
well as the depreciation rates are captured by pt;s and 
ft
;s; respectively.
2Level of education Ed is a discrete random variable in the model where it can take 4 di¤erent values
for: less than high school (LHS), high school (HS), some college (SC) and college (COL).
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3.3.1.3 Production Function of Children Parental time investment in children a¤ect
the future educational outcome of the child which is denoted by Ed0. and innate ability 
0
;
both a¤ecting the childs earnings (see Equation 3.17).
The state vector for the child in the rst period of her life cycle x00 is determined by the
intergenerational state transition function M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds) specically,
M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds) = Pr(0 j Ed0) Pr(Ed0 j xf ; xm; Ds) Pr(0 j Ed0) Pr(Ed0 0 j Ed0)
(3.18)
Thus, we assume that the parental inputs and characteristics (parents education and xed
e¤ects) determines educational outcomes according to probability distribution Pr(Ed0 j
xf ; xm; Ds): The state vector of inputs contains the cumulative investment variables (low
time and high time) of each parent up to period T . We assign each child in the household
the average time investment assuming all children in the household receive the same time
input. Parentss characteristics include the education of the father and mother, their individ-
ual specic e¤ects and race. Once the education level is determined, it is assumed that the
ability 0 is determined according to the probability distribution Pr(
0
 j Ed0). The spouses
education is also determined after the realization of the childs education according to the
distribution Pr(Ed0 0 j Ed0); potentially capturing assortative mating. The above form of
the transition allows us to estimate the equations separately for the production function of
children given as the rst two probabilities, and the marriage market matching given as the
last term.
3.3.1.4 Existence of MPE in Pure Strategies We need one nal assumption to
guarantee that there exist a MPE in pure strategies.
Assumption 1: For an increasing levels of dEd
Pr(dEdjk0t; k0 t; xt) Pr(dEdjkt; k0 t; xt)  Pr(dEdjk0t; k t; xt) Pr(dEdjkt; k t; xt)
for all k0t  kt and k0 t  k t:
The property implies that the di¤erences in outcomes of children in terms of higher x00
are weakly higher the larger the existing stock of investment. Thus, if there are complemen-
tarities in time investment of parents or if the increase in outcomes is independent of the
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spouses investment, the condition is satised. Table 4 shows that this condition is satised.
It is important that we estimated the education production function outside the main esti-
mation hence we can verify that these exist a MPE in pure strategies before the imposing
it. This guarantees that our estimator is well dene over the parameters space.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 and given the specication in equation (3.14), (3.16),
(3.17) and (3.18); there exist a MPE in Pure Strategy.
3.4 RESULTS
As noted in the estimation section we used a multi-stage estimation technique. As such we
present the results in three stages. The rst stage presents the estimates of the intergener-
ation education production function, the earnings equation, the unobserved skills function,
the marital status transition functions, and the marriage assignment functions. All these
functions are fundamental parameters of our model which are estimated outside the main
estimation of the preference, discounts factors, household sharing rules (coe¢ cient on own
and spouse earnings in the utility function), and the net costs of raising children parame-
ters. The rst stage estimates also include equilibrium objects such as the conditional choice
probabilities and the best response functions. The second stage presents estimates of the
intergenerational and intertemporal discount factors, the preference parameters, the house-
hold sharing rules, and child care cost parameters. The third and nal stage presents counter
factual estimates of the return to parental time investment and the value of children.
3.4.1 First Stage Estimates
3.4.1.1 Intergenerational Education Production Function A well known problem
with the estimation of production functions is the simultaneity of the inputs. As is clear
from the structural model the intergenerational education production function su¤ers from
a similar problem. However, because the output of the intergeneration education production
(i.e. completed education level) is determined over generations while the inputs, such as
parental time investment, are determined during the life cycle, we can treat these inputs
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as predetermined and use instruments from within the system to estimate the production
function.
Table 6 presents results of a Three Stage Least Square estimation of the system of
individual educational outcomes. The estimation uses mothers and fathers labor market
hours over the rst 5 years of the childs life as well as linear and quadratic terms of mothers
and fathers age on the 5th birth day of the child as instruments. The estimation results
show that a child whos mother has a college education has a signicantly higher probability
of graduating from college and a lower probability of only being a high school graduate, while
if a childs father has some college or college education the child has a higher probability of
graduating from college.
We measure parental time investment as the sum of the parental time investment over
the rst 5 years of the childs life. Total time investment is a variable that ranges between 0
and 10 since low parental investment is coded as 1 and high parental investment is coded as 2.
The results in Table 6 shows that while mothers time investment signicantly increases the
probability of a child graduating from college, fathers time investment signicantly increases
the probability of the child graduating from high and going to college. These estimates
suggest that while motherstime investment increases the probability of a high educational
outcome, fatherstime investment truncates low educational outcome. However, both par-
entstime investment is productive in terms of children education outcomes. It is important
to note that mothersand fathershours spent with children are at di¤erent margins, with
mothers providing signicantly more than fathers. Thus the magnitudes of the discrete levels
of time investment of mothers and fathers are not directly comparable since what constitutes
low and high investment di¤ers across genders.
The results in Table 6 also show that females are more likely to enter and graduate college
than males. Interestingly, controlling for parental characteristics and time investment, black
children have a higher probability of graduating from college as well as a higher probability
of not graduating from high school than white children.
Table 7 presents the predicted probabilities of a childs education outcomes by parents
education and time investment for a white male child. This exercise illustrates the quanti-
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Table 6: 3SLS System Estimation the Education Production Function
(Standard Errors in parenthesis; Excluded class is Less than High School)
Variable
High
School
Some
College
College
High School Father 0.008 0.023 0.155
(0.068) (0.104) (0.128)
Some College Father -0.012 0.057 0.162
(0.047) (0.074) (0.086)
College Father -0.014 0.021 0.229
(0.071) (0.110) (0.135)
High School Mother 0.004 0.093 0.083
(0.057) (0.089) (0.107)
Some College Mother -0.016 0.036 -0.089
(0.054) (0.085) (0.098)
College Mother -0.122 0.03 0.222
(0.076) (0.116) (0.140)
Mothers Time -0.091 -0.048 0.299
(0.075) (0.114) (0.130)
Fathers Time 0.153 0.273 -0.108
(0.069) (0.103) (0.131)
Mothers Labor Income 0.021 -0.014 -0.004
(0.025) (0.039) (0.048)
Fathers Labor Income 0.015 0.018 -0.023
(0.010) (0.016) (0.020)
Female 0.034 0.158 0.110
(0.030) (0.045) (0.056)
Black -0.227 -0.236 0.324
(0.093) (0.141) (0.168)
Constant 0.606 -0.416 -0.889
(0.255) (0.396) (0.450)
Observations 980 980 980
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and include individuals surveyed between 1968 and 1997. Instruments: Mothers and fathers labor market
hours over the childs rst 8 years of life, linear and quadratic terms of mothers and fathers age when the
child was 5 years old.
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Table 7: The probability of white male childs education outcome
CHILDS EDUCATION
Mothers
Education
Fathers
Education
Investment
Less than
high school
High
School
Some
College
College
Graduate
Less than
high school
Less than
high school
NO 0.14 0.86 0.00 0.00
High School High School NO 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00
Some College Some College NO 0.16 0.84 0.00 0.00
College
Graduate
College
Graduate
NO 0.29 0.71 0.00 0.00
Less than
high school
Less than
high school
AVG 0.14 0.59 0.24 0.03
High School High School AVG 0.13 0.48 0.12 0.27
Some College Some College AVG 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.34
College
Graduate
College
Graduate
AVG 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.79
Less than
high school
Less than
high school
MAX 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.77
High School High School MAX 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Some College Some College MAX 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
College
Graduate
College
Graduate
MAX 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
53
tative magnitude of the e¤ect of parental time investment on education outcomes. It shows
that if both parents have less than a high school education and invest no parental time
over the childs rst ve years of life, the child has a 14% chance of not completing high
school and 86% chance of graduating college. However, if both parents invest the average
time observed in our sample then while the chance of not completing high school does not
change, the probability of some college increases to 24% and the chance of graduating college
increases to 3%. If both parents invest the maximum amount of time then the probabilities
of not graduating from high school or only graduating high school are zero, the probability
of some college is 23% and the probability of graduating from college is 77%. This pattern is
repeated for other education groups; if both parents are college graduates but do not invest
then the child has no chance of going to or graduating from college. These results suggest
that there are signicant returns to parental time investment and in the rest of the paper
we quantify these returns.
3.4.1.2 Earnings Equation and Unobserved Traits Table 8 presents the estimates
of the earnings equation and the function of unobserved ( to the econometrician) individual
skill. The top panel of the rst column shows that the age-earnings prole is signicantly
steeper for higher levels of completed education; the slope of the age-log-earnings prole for a
college graduate is about 3 times that of an individual with less than a high school education.
However, the largest gap is due to being a college graduate; the of the age-log-earnings prole
for a college graduate is about twice that of an individual with only some college. These
results conrm that there are signicant returns to parental time investment in kids in terms
of labor market because parental investment signicantly increases the likelihood of higher
education outcomes which signicantly increases life time labor market earnings.
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Table 8: Estimates of Earnings Equation
Dependent Variable: Log of Yearly Earnings
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Demographic Variables Fixed E¤ect
Age Squared -4.0e-4 Female x Full time work -0.125 Black -0.154
(1.0e-5) (0.010) (0.009)
Age x LHS 0.037 Female x Full time work (t-1) 0.110 Female -0.484
(0.002) (0.010) (0.007)
Age x HS 0.041 Female x Full time work (t-2) 0.025 HS 0.136
(0.001) (0.010) (0.005)
Age x SC 0.050 Female x Full time work (t-3) 0.010 SC 0.122
(0.001) (0.010) (0.006)
Age x COL 0.096 Female x Full time work (t-4) 0.013 COL 0.044
(0.001) (0.010) (0.006)
Current and Lags of Participation Female x Part time work (t-1) 0.150 Black x HS -0.029
Full time work 0.938 (0.010) (0.010)
(0.010) Female x Part time work (t-2) 0.060 Black x SC 0.033
Full time work (t-1) 0.160 (0.010) (0.008)
(0.009) Female x Part time work (t-3) 0.040 Black x COL 0.001
Full time work (t-2) 0.044 (0.010) (0.011)
(0.010) Female x Part time work (t-4) -0.002 Female x HS -0.054
Full time work (t-3) 0.025 (0.010) (0.008)
(0.010) Individual Specic E¤ects Yes Female x SC 0.049
Full time work (t-4) 0.040 (0.006)
(0.010) Female x COL 0.038
Part time work (t-1) -0.087 (0.007)
(0.010) Constant 0.167
Part time work (t-2) -0.077 (0.005)
(0.010)
Part time work (t-3) -0.070
(0.010)
Part time work (t-4) -0.010 Hausman Statistics 2296
(0.010) Hausman P-Value 0.000
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Table 8 (contd): Estimates of Earnings Equation
N 134,007
Number of Individuals 14,018
R-squared 0.44 0.278
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and
include individuals surveyed between 1968 and 1997. Yearly earnings is measured in 2005 dollars. LHS is a dummy
variable indicating that the individual has completed education of less than high school; HS is a dummy variable
indicating that the individual has completed education of high school but college; SC is a dummy variable
indicating that the individual has completed education of greater than high school but is not a college graduate;
COL is a dummy variable indicating that the individual has completed education of at least a college graduate.
The bottom panel of the rst column and the second of column of Table 8 show that full
time workers earn 2.6 times more than part time workers for males, and 2.3 times more than
part time workers for females. It also shows that there are signicant returns to past full time
employment for both genders; however, females have higher returns to full time labor market
experience than males. The same is not true for part time labor market experience; males
earnings are lower if they work part time in the past while the there are positive returns
to the most recent female part time experience. However, part time experiences 2 and 3
years in the past are associated with lower earnings for females, these rates of reduction in
earnings are however lower than that of males. These results are similar to those nd in Gayle
and Golan (forthcoming)(33) and maybe reect some form of statistical discrimination in
the labor market in which past labor market history reect beliefs of employers on workers
labor market attachment in the presence of hiring costs.3 These results imply that there
are signicant costs in the labor market in terms of loss of human capital from spending
time with kids, if spending more time with kids comes at the expense of working more in
the labor market. This cost may be smaller for female than males because part time work
reduces compensation less for females than males. If a female works part time for 3 years,
for example, in order to invest time in kids she loses signicantly less human capital than
a male working part time for 3 years instead of full time. This may give rise to females
3These results are also consistent with part time jobs being more di¤ferent than full time jobs, for males
more than for females.
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specializing in child care; this specialization comes from the labor market and production
function of childs outcome as is the current wisdom.
The unobserved skill (to the econometrician) is assumed to be a parameter function of the
strictly exogenous time-invariant components of the individual variables. This assumption
is used in other papers such as Macurdy (1981)(55) Chamberlain (1986)(18), Nijman and
Verbeek (1992)(67), Zabel (1992)(86), Newey (1994)(66), Altug and Miller (1998)(4), and
Gayle and Viauroux (2007)(32). It allows us to introduce unobserved heterogeneity to the
model but at the same time maintain the assumption on the discreteness of the state space
of the dynamic programming problem needed for the estimation of the structural parameters
from the dynastic model. The Hausman statistic shows that we cannot reject this correlated
xed e¤ect specication. Column 3 of Table 8 presents the estimate of the skill as function of
unobserved characteristics; it shows that blacks and females have lower unobserved skill than
whites and males. This could capture labor market discrimination. Education increases the
level of the skill but it increases at a decreasing rate in the level of completed education. The
rate of increase for blacks and females with some college and a college degree are higher than
their white and male counterparts. This pattern is reversed for blacks and females with a
high school diploma. Notice that the skill is another transmission mechanism through which
parental time investment a¤ects labor market earnings in addition to education.
3.4.1.3 Married Transitions and Assignment Table 9 presents the logit coe¢ cient
estimates of the one period transition from single to marriage. It shows that blacks of both
genders are less likely to be married next period if they are currently single. The level of
education does not have any e¤ect on the males transition from single to married. However
a single female with a high school education is more likely to transition to marriage next
period than any other level of education, while a single female with a college degree is less
likely to transition to marriage next period than any other education group. This result may
mean that while college education for females is valuable in the labor market it may not be
as valuable in the marriage market, however, another option is that college education implies
a better outside options and a higher value of being single.
Table 9 also shows the single to married transition probabilities are concave in age for
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both genders. The number of children, while not a¤ecting the female transition, increases the
probability of a single male transition to marriage next period. Working part time in the past
does not have any signicant e¤ect on malestransition from single to marriage. However,
working part time or full time last period reduces the probability that a single female will
transition to marriage next period, while working full time 2 year in the past reduces the
probability that a single male transition to marriage next period. The age distribution of
current children or the time spent with them do not have a signicant e¤ect on the transition
probability of a single female, however, the older the second child of a single male the more
likely he is to get marry next period.
The right hand panel of Table 9 shows that all the current choices of a single female
increase the probability she will transition to married next period relative to choosing no
work-no birth-no time with children. For males all choices except those that involve a
choice of not working while spending time with children (i.e. choices 4 and 7) increase the
likelihood he will transition to marriage next period relative to not working while providing
no parental time. In fact we nd that if a single male chooses to work part time and supply
low parental time he will transition to marriage next period with probability one.
Table 9 presents the logit coe¢ cient estimates of the one period divorce rates. It shows
that black females have a higher divorce rate than their white counterpart while there are
no di¤erences between the black and white males one period divorce rates. There is also no
e¤ect of a persons education on the one period divorce rate. For females the one period
divorce rate is convex in age while age does not have any signicant e¤ect on the one period
divorce rate of males. A similar patterns hold for the number of children. Table 9 also shows
that if a female worked full time last period she is more likely to get divorce next period
than a female who did not work or worked part time last period. Past work behavior does
not have any signicant e¤ect on malesone period divorce rate. The age distribution of
current children does not have any e¤ect on females one period divorce rate, however, the
older a males 4th child, the less likely he will get divorce next period. The time spent with
current kids in the past or the number of female kids does not have any e¤ect on the one
period divorce rates of females. However, the more time a male spends with his 3rd child the
higher the one period divorce rate while the more time he spends with his 4th child reduces
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the divorce rate. Overall it seems that if a male has four kids he is less likely to get divorced
next period.
59
Table 9: Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates Transition from Single to Married
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal one if married and zero otherwise
(Standard Error in parentheses)
State Variables Choice Variables
Variables Female Male Choice Female Male
Black -1.339 -1.952 2 1.365 0.951
(0.066) (0.168) (0.132) (0.289)
High School 0.300 0.172 3 1.005 1.774
(0.101) (0.153) (0.092) (0.134)
Some College 0.108 0.029 4 1.552 0.320
(0.104) (0.158) (0.333) (1.072)
College Graduate -0.297 0.167 5 0.820
(0.109) (0.157) (0.205)
Age 0.324 0.408 6 1.251 1.646
(0.040) (0.064) (0.237) (0.299)
Age Sq -0.006 -0.007 7 1.249 0.622
(0.001) (0.001) (0.162) (1.063)
No. of Children -0.338 1.849 8 1.303 1.410
(0.205) (0.412) (0.240) (1.115)
No. of Children Sq 0.078 -0.216 9 1.555 2.406
(0.069) (0.144) (0.331) (0.301)
Part time work (t-1) -0.268 -0.128 10 1.183
(0.135) (0.270) (0.411)
Part time work (t-2) 0.060 -0.399 11 1.210
(0.130) (0.289) (0.223)
Part time work (t-3) 0.143 -0.201 12 1.754
(0.132) (0.361) (0.301)
Part time work (t-4) -0.105 -0.144 13 1.450
(0.136) (0.358) (0.209)
Full time work (t-1) -0.264 0.025 14 1.400
(0.102) (0.159) (0.243)
Full time work (t-2) 0.166 -0.530 15 1.763
(0.106) (0.178) (0.431)
Full time work (t-3) -0.129 0.100 16 1.781
(0.113) (0.207) (0.309)
Full time work (t-4) -0.146 0.014
(0.101) (0.189)
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Table 9 (contd): Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates Transition from Single to Married
Variables Female Male
Age of 1st Child 0.026 0.008
(0.018) (0.032)
Age of 2nd Child 0.007 -0.082
(0.029) (0.050)
Age of 3rd Child 0.030
(0.050)
Age of 4th Child 0.170
(0.128)
Time with 1st Child -0.010 -0.013
(0.032) (0.058)
Time with 2nd Child -0.020 -0.356
(0.044) (0.116)
Time with 3nd Child -0.046
(0.070)
Time with 4th Child -0.316
(0.184) Constant -6.527 -9.457
No. of Female Children -0.053 -0.111 (0.498) (0.810)
(0.073) (0.179) N 30,875 30,492
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) between 1968 and 1997. Choice 5 for male is deterministic and is excluded; meaning if single
male chooses to work part time and supply low child care hours he will get married next period
with probability one.
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Table 10: Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates Transition from Married to Married
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal one if married and zero otherwise
(Standard Error in parentheses)
State Variables Choice Variables
Individual Spouse Individual Spouse
Variables Female Male Female Male Choice Female Male Female Male
Black -0.825 -0.397 2 -0.483 1.042 0.488 2.619
(0.098) (0.289) (0.197) (0.553) (0.159) (0.527)
High School 0.037 0.038 0.019 -0.407 3 -0.665 1.112 1.860 3.525
(0.130) (0.224) (0.111) (0.271) (0.158) (0.408) (0.122) (0.330)
Some College -0.118 0.223 0.129 -0.610 4 -0.213 0.518 0.136
(0.137) (0.240) (0.121) (0.284) (0.514) (1.085) (0.248)
College Graduate 0.161 0.431 0.576 -0.552 5 -0.034 0.012 3.508
(0.164) (0.258) (0.146) (0.313) (0.224) (0.253) (0.345)
Age -0.155 -0.047 0.190 -0.136 6 -0.041 0.673 2.114 3.875
(0.067) (0.140) (0.053) (0.169) (0.238) (0.434) (0.163) (0.456)
Age Square 0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.002 7 -0.461 -0.536 0.814 3.745
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.193) (0.616) (0.296) (0.279)
No.of Children -0.349 -0.637 8 -0.125 0.553 0.378 2.759
(0.179) (0.425) (0.257) (0.820) (0.272) (0.528)
No. of
Children Sq
0.039 0.146 9 -0.269 0.894 1.654 3.020
(0.053) (0.150) (0.285) (0.451) (0.164) (0.769)
Part time work
(t-1)
-0.207 0.480 0.037 1.024 10 -0.034 3.273
(0.128) (0.473) (0.184) (0.223) (0.336) (0.552)
Part time work
(t-2)
0.121 -0.422 0.025 -0.496 11 0.463 2.273
(0.136) (0.403) (0.202) (0.219) (0.232) (0.220)
Part time work
(t-3)
-0.126 0.295 0.277 -0.232 12 -0.063 2.728
(0.144) (0.429) (0.234) (0.208) (0.248) (0.320)
Part time work
(t-4)
-0.140 -0.649 0.737 -0.283 13 -0.304 3.273
(0.135) (0.399) (0.260) (0.197) (0.219) (0.317)
Full time work
(t-1)
-0.264 -0.098 -0.049 1.830 14 0.296 2.592
(0.119) (0.411) (0.112) (0.226) (0.258) (0.363)
Full time work
(t-2)
0.163 -0.038 0.088 -1.028 15 -0.242 3.111
(0.129) (0.361) (0.119) (0.223) (0.332) (0.777)
Full time work
(t-3)
-0.093 -0.045 0.213 -0.031 16 0.473 4.106
(0.135) (0.358) (0.133) (0.232) (0.386) (1.056)
Full time work
(t-4)
0.138 -0.270 0.432 -0.490
(0.122) (0.322) (0.121) (0.201)
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Table 10 (contd): Logit Coe¢ cient Estimates Transition from Married to Married
State Variables
Individual Spouse
Variables Female Male Female Male
Age of 1st Child -0.003 -0.021
(0.018) (0.027)
Age of 2nd Child -0.003 -0.014
(0.025) (0.031)
Age of 3rd Child -0.023 -0.096
(0.041) (0.079)
Age of 4th Child 0.076 0.226
(0.079) (0.109)
Time with
1st Child
-0.043 -0.033 0.088 -0.136
(0.031) (0.041) (0.029) (0.048)
Time with
2nd Child
0.052 0.072 -0.016 0.099
(0.038) (0.063) (0.036) (0.053)
Time with
3rd Child
0.010 -0.222 0.079 0.222
(0.062) (0.109) (0.060) (0.129)
Time with
4th Child
-0.054 0.771 0.045 -0.494
(0.092) (0.378) (0.171) (0.144) Constant 0.450 4.779
No. of Female
Children
-0.046 -0.056 (0.819) (1.811)
(0.066) (0.111) N 23,694 14,740
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between
1968 and 1997. Individuals choice 5 and spouse choice 4 are deterministic for male and are excluded; meaning for a
married male if these choices are chosen he will remain married next period with probability one.
Table 10 also shows that maleswhose spouse has some college or a college degree are
more likely to get divorced while the opposite is true for females. The older a female spouse
the less likely she is to get divorce next period. A male whose spouse worked part or full
time last period is less likely to get divorce next period relative to one with a spouse who
did not work; the same is true for a female spouse who worked part or full time 4 years in
the past. This pattern is reversed for males whose spouse worked full or part time 2 or 4
years in the past. Males whose spouse provide high parental time investment in the 1st and
4th child are more likely to get divorce next period.
Females who work part time, give birth, and do not provide any child care hours in the
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current period (i.e. Choice 4) are more likely to divorce next period. The same is true
for females who work full time, do not give birth, and provide low child care hours in the
current period (i.e. Choice 7) . The opposite is true for a female who does not work or
give birth, but provides high child care hours (i.e. Choice 11). On the other hand, a male
who works full or part time and provides no child care hours (i.e. Choices 2 and 3) has a
lower probability of divorce next period relative to a male who does not work or provide any
parental time investment. The same is true for a male who worked full time and provide
high parental time investment (i.e. Choice 4). Again, we nd that males that worked part
time and provide low parental time never get divorce in our sample.
When it comes to the choices of femalesspouse the patterns are not so clear. We nd
that a female whose spouse works full or part time and does not provide any child care (i.e.
Choices 2 and 3) has a higher probability of remaining married next period relative to a
female whose spouse does not work or provides parental time investment. The same is true
for a female whose spouse works full time and provides some parental time investment (i.e.
Choices 6 and 9) or does not work but provides high parental time investment (i.e. Choice
7). For males all spouse choices lead to a lower divorce rate relative to choosing no work, no
birth, and no parental time.
3.4.1.4 Conditional Choice Probabilities of Single Females Table 11 presents the
logit coe¢ cient estimates of the conditional probability for single females. The excluded
category is choice 1, which in not participating in the labor market, not giving birth, and
not providing parental time investment. It shows that black females are less likely to choose
choices 2, 3, 7, and 13; the rst two involve working full or part time while not giving birth
or investing time in children and the last two involve working full time while not giving birth
and providing high or low parental time investment. On the other hand, black females are
more likely to choose choices 4, 8, and 9; the predominant feature of these choices is giving
birth. Therefore single black females are more likely to give birth than single white females.
It also shows that single female college graduates are less likely to choose choices 5, 8, 11,
and 14 which involve not working. At the same time they are more likely to choose choices
3 and 7 which involve working full time, not giving birth, and providing no or low levels
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of parental time investment. While not as strong, a similar pattern holds for females with
high school or some college education. The number of children increases the likelihood of
any choice other than 1, at a decreasing rate. The same is true for all form of labor market
experience.
Table 11 also shows that the older the 1st child of a single female, the more likely she
chooses choice 1 relative to all the other choices, while the age of the 2nd child only has
a signicant positive e¤ect on choice 3 (i.e. full time work and no birth or parental time
investment) relative to the choice 1. The age of the 3rd child has a signicant positive e¤ect
on choice 2 (i.e. part time work, no birth, and no parental time invest) and choice 4 (i.e. full
time work, birth, and no parental time investment); however, the e¤ect on choice 4 is much
greater than on choice 2. The age of the 4th child has a signicant positive e¤ect on choices
2 and 4, which is similar to the e¤ect of the age of the 3th child. Unlike the e¤ect of the age
of the 3rd child, the e¤ect of the age of the 4th child on the likelihood of choices 8, 9, 10,
14, 15, and 16 is negative. The predominant features of all these choice are giving birth and
providing positive parental investment. Past time investment in the 1st child has a positive
e¤ect on the likelihood of choice 5 through 16 relative to choice 1; these are all choices that
involve providing positive amount of parental time investment. The only negative e¤ect of
past parental time investment in the 1st child is on choice 4, which is full time work, giving
birth, and providing no parental time investment. Past parental investment in the 2nd child
has a signicant negative e¤ect on the likelihood of choices 3, 5, and 6 relative to choice 1, all
involving not giving birth. The e¤ects of parental time investment in the 3th child are similar
to those of parental time investment in the 1st child except they are not as signicant. There
are no clear patterns to the e¤ect of parental time investment in the 4th child (there are
both negative and positive e¤ects on di¤erent aspects of the choices). Finally, the number
of female children reduces the likelihood of choice 9 and 12, which all involve working part
time with positive parental time investment.
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3.4.1.5 Conditional Choice Probabilities of Single Males Table 12 presents the
logit coe¢ cient estimates of the conditional choice probability for single males. It shows
that black males are less likely than white males to choose choices 3, 4, 5, and 9 relative to
the choice 1 (i.e. not working and providing parental time investment). It seems black males
are less likely to specialized in parental time investment than white males and they are less
likely to work full time.
Table 12 also shows that a college educated and high school graduate single males are
more likely overall to work full time than single men with only some college. College gradu-
ates are more likely to make choices 3 and 5; these choices involve either full time work with
no parental time investment or part time work with low parental time investment. A similar
pattern holds for high school graduates or some college. On the other hand college graduate
is less likely than single male with less than a high school education to choose choices 4,
7, and 8; these choices involve specialization in parental time investment to some extent.
Similar patterns hold for high school graduate and some college. Similar to single females,
the number of children increases the likelihood of single males making choices 4 through
9 relative to choice 1. All these choices involve providing some parental time investment.
Therefore even single males with child are more likely to invest time in their children. The
only negative e¤ects of any type of labor market experience are on choices 4, 5, and 7; these
are all choices that involve not working or working part time with low parental time invest-
ment. Therefore as with single females labor market experience increases the likelihood of
continue labor market participation. The only positive e¤ect of the age distribution of kids
on the choices of single males is the positive e¤ect of the age of the 1st child on the prob-
ability of full time work while providing low parental time investment. Finally the number
of female children increases the likelihood that a single male would choose choices 3, 5, 6,
and 9; that is either working full time while not providing any parental time investment or
working and working with some parental time investment.
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Table 12: Logit Coe¢ cient of Conditional Choice Probability for Single Male
(Standard Error in parenthesis; Choice 1 is the excluded class)
Choice
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Black 0.162 -0.392 -11.687 -1.034 -0.627 1.080 0.020 -1.085
(0.096) (0.061) (1.467) (0.803) (0.408) (0.783) (0.908) (0.399)
High Sch. -0.304 0.257 -0.352 10.887 0.490 0.664 2.131 0.792
(0.143) (0.091) (1.050) (1.535) (0.376) (0.924) (1.544) (0.383)
Some Col. -0.207 0.199 -1.564 9.350 0.050 0.257 1.003 -0.119
(0.150) (0.095) (1.424) (1.896) (0.384) (1.377) (1.613) (0.401)
College -0.176 0.416 -10.694 9.523 0.638 -9.201 -9.494 0.522
(0.158) (0.096) (1.930) (1.560) (0.401) (2.613) (1.843) (0.405)
Age 0.747 0.878 4.777 0.598 1.231 0.175 2.905 1.200
(0.070) (0.038) (2.284) (0.419) (0.194) (0.423) (1.173) (0.170)
Age Sq -0.013 -0.015 -0.066 -0.010 -0.020 -0.003 -0.040 -0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.017) (0.002)
No.of kids -0.344 -0.639 9.951 8.270 5.007 13.350 18.071 5.533
(1.133) (0.988) (2.536) (2.767) (1.070) (1.945) (1.833) (1.420)
No. of kids Sq -0.095 -0.053 -1.986 -1.884 -1.255 -3.021 -6.542 -1.431
(0.205) (0.170) (0.834) (0.883) (0.249) (0.718) (0.830) (0.434)
Part work (t-1) 4.217 3.321 3.387 12.425 3.291 -12.458 3.564 4.093
(0.198) (0.154) (1.507) (1.619) (1.491) (2.129) (1.330) (0.842)
Part work (t-2) 1.625 0.864 1.918 -8.906 19.273 2.239 -1.285 1.877
(0.340) (0.306) (1.264) (1.505) (3.549) (1.254) (1.860) (1.079)
Part work (t-3) -0.070 -0.731 2.332 -2.607 -1.128 0.017 0.551 -0.854
(0.405) (0.359) (1.106) (1.170) (0.901) (1.716) (1.581) (0.929)
Part work (t-4) 0.788 0.318 -1.086 12.434 1.755 1.296 2.003 1.473
(0.446) (0.382) (1.439) (1.280) (0.911) (1.810) (1.483) (0.783)
Full work (t-1) 4.397 5.075 -0.887 10.881 5.668 0.274 3.195 4.791
(0.169) (0.101) (1.559) (1.238) (1.255) (0.994) (1.357) (0.735)
Full work (t-2) 0.787 1.079 2.434 1.101 19.181 -0.119 0.431 2.194
(0.255) (0.203) (1.739) (1.012) (3.549) (1.891) (1.558) (0.874)
Full work (t-3) 0.205 0.443 -0.200 -2.632 -0.460 -0.928 0.525 -0.056
(0.350) (0.284) (1.413) (1.324) (0.800) (1.636) (1.624) (0.811)
Full work (t-4) 0.741 0.599 -2.839 8.379 1.543 -1.522 0.705 1.187
(0.338) (0.283) (0.981) (1.460) (0.754) (1.048) (1.258) (0.650)
Age of 1st kid 0.100 0.188 0.064 0.006 0.320 -0.042 0.136 0.162
(0.158) (0.135) (0.267) (0.200) (0.138) (0.185) (0.146) (0.139)
Age of 2nd kid 0.050 -0.063 -0.504 -0.029 -0.205 -0.302 0.175 -0.168
(0.133) (0.123) (0.352) (0.170) (0.128) (0.341) (0.187) (0.129)
Female kids 1.402 1.793 -0.329 1.404 1.247 1.091 -1.029 1.446
(0.831) (0.672) (1.864) (0.717) (0.667) (0.859) (1.291) (0.658)
Constant -14.516 -14.955 -94.644 -44.118 -46.713 -13.193 -68.683 -29.242
(0.910) (0.481) (40.775) (6.828) (0.000) (6.150) (21.834) (2.969)
N 35,939 35,939 35,939 35,939 35,939 35,939 35,939 35,939
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
between 1968 and 1997.
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3.4.1.6 Best Response Functions Unlike single individuals, married couples are en-
gaged in a non-corporative game of complete information, therefore we have to estimate the
best response function of each spouse. These best response functions do not only depend on
the individuals state space but also on the state space and choices of their spouses.
FemalesEx-ante Best Response Probabilities
Table 13 presents the logit coe¢ cient estimates of ex-ante conditional best response
probabilities of a married female. It shows that the behavior of single black females and
married black females di¤ers signicantly. Specically, married black females are less likely
to choose 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13 and 14 relative to their white counterparts. The rst choice
is working full time while doing nothing else; the next three choices (i.e. choices 5, 6, and
7) involve not giving birth while providing low parental time investment; and the last four
(i.e. choices 11, 12, 13, and 14) involve high time investment while either giving birth,
working, or doing nothing. So while they behave di¤erently from white married females it
is hard to make any generalization as the choices include di¤erent combinations of work,
birth, and parental time investment, however, overall black married females are less likely
to make choices involving high parental time investment relative to white married women.
Similar to single female, college educated married females are more likely to choose almost
all other choices relatives to choice 1. This pattern is similar for high school graduates and
some college education. The same is true for the e¤ect of the number of children. Again all
types of labor market experiences make it more likely to work in the current period.
Table 13 also shows that the age of the 1st child has a signicant negative e¤ect on the
likelihood of choices 8, 11, 14, 15, and 16; most of these choices involve giving birth in the
current period. The e¤ects of the age distribution of older children are not as striking as those
of the age of the 1st child. Parental time investment in the 1st child has a signicant positive
e¤ect on the likelihood of choices 5 through 16; therefore past parental time investment in
the 1st child leads to higher likelihood of current parental time investment. The pattern is
reversed for parental time investment in the 2nd child, in fact the likelihood of the choices
relative to doing nothing, except choice 2 which is statistically insignicant, increases in the
time invested in the second child. This may be because most families have only 2 children.
This pattern is repeated for parental time investment in the 3rd and 4th child.
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The second panel of Table 13 presents the e¤ect of spouses characteristics on the ex-ante
conditional best response of married female. If a females spouse is a college graduate, the
female has a higher likelihood of choosing 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 14. As usual similar patterns
hold for high school or some college education. Therefore education of the spouse increases
the likelihood of specialization either in the labor market or at home. Spouses labor market
experience has the opposite e¤ect on the likelihood choices relative to the females own labor
market. All else equal, the more labor market experience a females spouse has, the more
likely that the female will choose not to work. The more parental investment a females
spouse made in their 1st child, the lower the likelihood of the female choosing 11 through
16. These are all choices involving high parental time investment. This shows that fathers
parental investment seems to be a substitute for mothersparental investment. A similar
pattern holds for the spouses parental time investment in the 3rd child, except that there is
also a reduced likelihood of the female choosing choices 5,6, and 7. The additional choices
involve low parental time investment of the female. The e¤ect of the 4th child is similar to
those above except that higher spouse parental time investment in the 4th child increases
the likelihood of female choosing not to work while giving birth and providing high parental
time investment.
The nal panel of Table 13 presents the reaction function of spouses choices on the
female ex-ante probability of choices. It shows that if the spouse choose to work part time
(i.e. spouse choices 2, 5, and 8) the female is more likely to work. If the spouse works full
time (i.e. spouse choices 3, 6, and 9) the female is still more likely to work but is also more
likely to give birth or provide positive parental time investment. If the spouse chooses not
to work and provide low parental time investment, the female is less likely to choose 2, 4,
and 11. These choices involve either not providing parental time investment and work full
time (whether the female chooses to give birth or not) or provide high time investment in
children and not work.
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MalesEx-ante Best Response Probabilities
Table 14 presents the logit coe¢ cient estimates of the ex-ante best response probabilities
of a married male. Most of the e¤ects of males own variables on these probabilities are similar
to that of single males. Table 12, however, shows that a male with a spouse who is college
educated is less likely to choose not to work and provide high parental time investment. The
same is true if his spouse is a high school graduate or attended some college. Apart from the
e¤ect of parental time investment in their 4th child, which reduces the likelihood of a male
choosing not to work and provide low parental time investment, none of the other spouse
characteristics has any e¤ect on his choices.
The nal panel in table 14 represents the reaction function of the males choice probabil-
ities to his spouses choices. It shows that if the spouse chooses to work part time and not
provide parental time investment or give birth (i.e. females choice 2) then the male is less
likely to choose choice 4, 5, and 9; that is he is less likely to work part time and provide high
or low child care and less likely not to work and provide high time investment in children,
and is more likely to choose to work full time and do nothing else. If the spouse chooses
to work full time and give birth while not provide parental time investment the husband is
least likely to choose not to work and provide low parental time investment. However, he is
more likely to choose 5 or 7, which involve providing low parental investment while working
full time or not working while providing high parental time investment. This is a case where
the female is the main bread winner and gives birth, and the husband responds by providing
the parental investment.
If the female choose to work part time while not giving birth, but provides low parental
time investment, then the husband is more likely to choose choices 6 through 9; the rst (
i.e. males choice 6) involves working full time while providing low parental time investment
while the last three involve high parental time investment. A similar pattern holds for choice
7 (i.e. female choosing full time work, no birth, and low parental investment) except that
there is a higher likelihood of choosing choices 3 and 4. If the female chooses choices 8 (i.e.
not working, birth, and low parental time investment) then the male is least likely to choose
7 (i.e. not working and high parental time investment) and most likely to choose 4 (i.e. not
working and low parental time investment). This highlights the fact that if the female does
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not work then the male has a higher probability of working. If the female chooses to work
part time, give birth, and provides low parental time investment, then the husband has a
higher likelihood of working in all possible combinations of parental time investment. On
the other hand if the female chooses to work full time, give birth, and provide low parental
time investment (i.e. choice 10) then the husband is more likely to provide the parental
time investment (i.e. choices 4 through 9). This type of substitution pattern is highlighted
through the other males reactions to the female choices. Overall the reaction functions of
both males and females display a certain degree of cooperation in their behavior. However,
in cases in which females either do not give birth or provide no parental time investment,
both spouses seem to focus on the maximizing labor income and leisure.
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Table 14: Logit Coe¢ cient of Best Response for Married Male
(Standard Error in parenthesis; Choice 1 is the excluded class)
Choice
Individual
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Black 0.297 -0.350 0.277 0.230 -0.368 -0.248 0.473 -0.330
(0.332) (0.288) (0.675) (0.684) (0.313) (0.737) (0.559) (0.325)
High Sch. 0.352 0.696 0.020 1.137 0.885 -0.219 0.905 0.864
(0.280) (0.218) (0.459) (0.649) (0.241) (0.401) (0.483) (0.256)
Some Col. 0.356 0.841 0.518 1.149 1.083 -0.414 0.734 1.067
(0.314) (0.243) (0.525) (0.682) (0.266) (0.463) (0.522) (0.280)
College 0.786 1.212 0.816 1.768 1.700 0.222 0.966 1.581
(0.349) (0.277) (0.633) (0.789) (0.297) (0.592) (0.556) (0.311)
Age -0.316 -0.240 0.358 -0.694 -0.262 -0.122 0.057 -0.214
(0.157) (0.119) (0.245) (0.248) (0.127) (0.275) (0.232) (0.133)
Age Sq 0.004 0.002 -0.005 0.008 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
No.of kids -0.801 -0.102 1.665 1.019 1.144 2.331 2.835 1.122
(0.494) (0.412) (1.213) (0.819) (0.444) (0.879) (0.869) (0.458)
No.of kids Sq 0.170 -0.080 -0.668 -0.306 -0.385 -0.825 -0.769 -0.444
(0.142) (0.119) (0.420) (0.269) (0.132) (0.272) (0.260) (0.137)
Part work (t-1) 2.288 0.697 0.005 1.438 1.237 -0.077 1.023 1.510
(0.377) (0.275) (0.453) (0.677) (0.410) (0.469) (0.556) (0.405)
Part work (t-2) -0.169 -0.740 -0.305 -0.347 -0.132 -0.630 0.212 -0.508
(0.475) (0.396) (0.578) (0.793) (0.459) (0.577) (0.662) (0.458)
Part work (t-3) 0.599 0.236 0.951 0.526 0.159 0.271 1.727 0.543
(0.531) (0.461) (0.682) (0.845) (0.496) (0.769) (0.677) (0.505)
Part work (t-4) 0.181 -0.547 -0.041 1.116 -0.457 -0.109 -0.891 -0.367
(0.474) (0.390) (0.638) (0.752) (0.423) (0.698) (0.546) (0.432)
Full work (t-1) 3.107 3.833 0.179 1.522 4.158 -0.414 1.642 3.912
(0.372) (0.264) (0.502) (0.701) (0.380) (0.496) (0.597) (0.382)
Full work (t-2) -0.276 0.366 -1.027 0.039 0.863 -0.620 -0.103 0.323
(0.469) (0.396) (0.660) (0.765) (0.442) (0.594) (0.729) (0.445)
Full work (t-3) -0.077 -0.091 -0.316 -0.393 -0.343 -0.022 0.145 -0.127
(0.494) (0.432) (0.772) (0.843) (0.457) (0.748) (0.687) (0.472)
Full work (t-4) 0.624 0.372 0.568 0.928 0.445 0.660 -0.660 0.311
(0.434) (0.364) (0.598) (0.774) (0.383) (0.694) (0.520) (0.395)
Age of 1st kid -0.006 -0.021 -0.057 -0.130 -0.053 -0.028 -0.224 -0.081
(0.039) (0.025) (0.056) (0.099) (0.027) (0.047) (0.087) (0.028)
Age of 2nd kid 0.101 0.101 -0.078 0.184 0.119 -0.079 0.291 0.131
(0.072) (0.052) (0.089) (0.116) (0.053) (0.103) (0.108) (0.054)
Age of 3rd kid -0.241 -0.237 -0.208 -0.507 -0.313 -0.186 -0.593 -0.301
(0.120) (0.077) (0.110) (0.161) (0.080) (0.122) (0.331) (0.084)
Age of 4th kid 0.122 0.205 -2.829 -0.221 0.012 0.212 -0.187 0.043
(0.168) (0.130) (2.666) (0.358) (0.164) (0.187) (0.463) (0.179)
Time 1st kid -0.078 -0.047 0.156 0.304 0.188 0.250 0.334 0.329
(0.081) (0.063) (0.096) (0.102) (0.063) (0.088) (0.097) (0.064)
Time 2nd kid -0.271 -0.146 -0.180 0.025 0.006 -0.131 0.055 0.112
(0.115) (0.081) (0.149) (0.135) (0.082) (0.147) (0.122) (0.083)
Time 3nd kid 0.937 0.703 0.354 0.723 0.863 1.387 0.771 1.097
(0.307) (0.277) (0.551) (0.511) (0.280) (0.416) (0.410) (0.283)
Time 4th kid -0.287 -0.672 -2.131 1.134 -0.435 -0.188 -0.092 -0.489
(0.397) (0.328) (1.166) (0.688) (0.334) (0.470) (0.660) (0.354)
Female kids 0.105 0.094 0.555 0.314 0.123 0.271 0.291 0.027
(0.213) (0.160) (0.264) (0.304) (0.162) (0.262) (0.252) (0.164)
Spouse
Variables
High Sch. -0.088 0.027 -0.805 -0.728 0.061 -1.430 -0.458 0.044
(0.396) (0.336) (0.540) (0.583) (0.356) (0.472) (0.530) (0.369)
Some Col. -0.091 -0.048 -0.737 -1.163 0.094 -1.061 -0.665 0.069
(0.425) (0.361) (0.586) (0.635) (0.381) (0.538) (0.580) (0.394)
College 0.258 0.460 -1.378 -1.052 0.537 -1.855 0.032 0.431
(0.464) (0.394) (0.855) (0.753) (0.415) (0.781) (0.627) (0.428)
Age -0.054 -0.186 -0.339 0.131 -0.151 -0.299 -0.261 -0.141
(0.170) (0.131) (0.268) (0.280) (0.137) (0.297) (0.253) (0.144)
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3.4.2 Preference Parameter Estimates
Table 15 presents the GMM estimates of the parameters characterizing the utility of functions
along with the various discount factors of the model. There are two sets of estimates; the rst
set consists of estimates of a baseline model where the parameters do not vary by demographic
characteristics, and the second set consists of estimates of an extended model where the
parameters vary by demographic characteristics and the education of the individuals in the
households.
First, the top left hand panel of Table 15 shows that there are per-period utility costs
of giving birth for females. This is demonstrated by the universal signicant and negative
coe¢ cients associated with all choices in the per-period utility function that involve giving
birth in the current period. This nding rationalizes the low frequency of these choices in
the data and conforms to the nding of previous literature on fertility behavior (see Wolpin
(1984)(84) and Hotz and Miller (1988)(42) for example).
While the utility for female is monotonically declining in the level of labor market work
for no birth and low level of parental time (i.e. choices 5 through 7), this is not always
the case for other choice permutations. This seems to be caused by the interaction of labor
market choice with parental time investment; some levels of parental time investment seem
to be preferred to no parental time if these choices do not involve low levels of leisure. This
implies that there may be some level of consumption value to maternal time investment. For
example, conditional on working part time in the labor market and not giving birth in the
current period, the utility of mothers are increasing in the level of parental time investment.
This monotonic relationship is not present conditional on working full time in the labor
market and not giving birth in the current period. This may be due to the nonlinear nature
of time requirements of jobs or occupations chosen by females. That is, the full time and part
time classication does not fully capture the degree of e¤ort or exibility of hours associated
with female job choices.
The top right hand panel of Table 15 presents the estimates for males. It shows that the
disutility from working in nonlinear in the level of labor market work activities. Conditional
on providing zero paternal time investment, males prefer working part time to either not
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Table 14 (contd): Logit Coe¢ cient of Best Response for Married Male
(Standard Error in parenthesis; Choice 1 is the excluded class)
Choice
Spouse
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Age Sq 0.000 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Part work (t-1) 0.232 -0.067 -0.581 0.971 0.102 0.510 0.356 0.306
(0.377) (0.328) (0.705) (0.576) (0.337) (0.634) (0.565) (0.342)
Part work (t-2) -0.191 -0.503 -0.365 -0.123 -0.454 -0.427 -0.094 -0.407
(0.387) (0.329) (0.669) (0.564) (0.337) (0.736) (0.550) (0.343)
Part work (t-3) 0.003 0.259 0.947 0.233 0.256 -0.182 0.324 0.235
(0.432) (0.366) (0.655) (0.539) (0.372) (0.695) (0.526) (0.376)
Part work (t-4) -0.346 -0.328 -0.949 -0.461 -0.393 -1.193 -0.518 -0.479
(0.373) (0.312) (0.678) (0.551) (0.319) (0.599) (0.477) (0.324)
Full work (t-1) -0.312 -0.519 -1.116 0.512 -0.186 -0.394 0.844 -0.008
(0.325) (0.279) (0.662) (0.535) (0.292) (0.542) (0.488) (0.301)
Full work (t-2) -0.030 -0.235 0.282 -0.157 -0.224 0.702 -0.204 -0.289
(0.377) (0.329) (0.781) (0.533) (0.338) (0.648) (0.533) (0.345)
Full work (t-3) 0.134 0.375 1.251 0.120 0.365 0.856 0.499 0.392
(0.395) (0.333) (0.760) (0.522) (0.342) (0.616) (0.489) (0.348)
Full work (t-4) -0.192 -0.001 -0.536 -0.064 -0.065 -1.011 -0.926 -0.210
(0.338) (0.286) (0.499) (0.502) (0.293) (0.519) (0.442) (0.298)
Time 1st kid 0.152 0.122 0.032 0.113 0.092 0.028 0.068 0.062
(0.085) (0.065) (0.092) (0.123) (0.066) (0.102) (0.091) (0.067)
Time 2nd kid -0.035 0.060 0.175 -0.172 -0.035 0.211 -0.178 -0.030
(0.110) (0.081) (0.151) (0.155) (0.082) (0.150) (0.129) (0.083)
Time 3nd kid -0.027 0.148 0.596 0.390 0.287 0.142 0.355 0.205
(0.182) (0.124) (0.269) (0.339) (0.131) (0.310) (0.416) (0.136)
Time 4th kid -0.113 0.004 -4.764 -0.757 0.191 0.137 0.686 0.277
(0.318) (0.238) (1.313) (0.545) (0.262) (0.417) (0.401) (0.290)
Spouse
Choice
2 0.798 0.708 -7.977 -7.524 -0.499 1.002 -7.642 -0.829
(0.415) (0.358) (0.835) (1.096) (0.575) (1.210) (1.226) (0.679)
3 0.354 0.802 -0.161 0.824 0.063 1.404 1.466 -0.461
(0.304) (0.261) (0.984) (1.178) (0.339) (1.055) (1.229) (0.364)
4 -0.386 0.473 -6.164 4.440 1.831 4.610 3.250 1.328
(1.474) (1.092) (1.250) (1.640) (1.141) (1.667) (1.815) (1.167)
5 -0.122 0.069 1.430 1.383 1.140 1.168 0.786 0.454
(0.547) (0.446) (1.061) (1.427) (0.504) (1.348) (1.301) (0.524)
6 1.504 1.492 2.418 2.769 2.865 3.323 3.109 2.186
(0.854) (0.781) (1.679) (1.567) (0.815) (1.456) (1.470) (0.825)
7 0.604 0.830 2.502 2.396 2.322 2.391 1.647 1.974
(0.466) (0.392) (1.097) (1.331) (0.456) (1.228) (1.231) (0.466)
8 -0.718 -0.460 2.423 2.116 1.060 -7.198 1.789 0.910
(0.773) (0.633) (1.249) (1.603) (0.687) (1.338) (1.717) (0.718)
9 6.506 6.774 -1.160 10.182 9.091 -1.574 9.375 8.853
(0.673) (0.401) (0.951) (1.423) (0.448) (1.432) (1.656) (0.462)
10 0.937 1.629 3.393 4.239 3.830 4.628 3.865 3.700
(1.068) (0.961) (1.790) (1.559) (0.982) (1.561) (1.607) (0.987)
11 -0.361 -0.081 0.906 2.506 1.384 2.199 2.126 1.345
(0.535) (0.432) (1.078) (1.429) (0.490) (1.213) (1.290) (0.500)
12 -0.075 0.547 -7.276 -7.612 2.158 1.873 2.971 2.224
(0.847) (0.649) (1.177) (1.456) (0.693) (1.706) (1.452) (0.702)
13 0.299 0.356 1.695 1.974 1.973 2.130 2.262 2.351
(0.550) (0.452) (1.180) (1.421) (0.510) (1.268) (1.291) (0.517)
14 0.395 0.478 3.171 3.066 2.587 4.139 3.675 2.531
(0.924) (0.875) (1.168) (1.632) (0.901) (1.387) (1.539) (0.905)
15 -0.447 -0.300 -6.222 -6.783 2.603 3.433 -6.367 2.656
(1.172) (0.967) (1.136) (1.438) (0.994) (1.630) (1.462) (1.001)
16 5.704 6.666 9.575 -1.741 9.070 9.779 10.682 9.833
(1.060) (0.391) (1.431) (1.197) (0.453) (1.669) (1.376) (0.444)
Constant 5.532 8.194 -3.548 4.329 3.242 4.242 -2.155 2.666
(1.966) (1.522) (3.343) (3.751) (1.671) (2.969) (3.560) (1.769)
N 16,548 16,548 16,548 16,548 16,548 16,548 16,548 16,548
Source: Data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between
1968 and 1997.
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working or working full time. Males, however, prefer not working in the labor market to
working full time in the labor market. A similar pattern holds conditional on providing low
paternal time investment. This pattern, however, is reversed conditional on providing high
paternal time investment. This seemingly counter intuitive nding, that males prefer some
work to not working, is the way the model rationalizes the low proportion of males that not
work in our data. Similar to females, there seems to be some level of consumption associated
with paternal time investment in children.
The second panel of Table 15 presents the discount factors. It shows that the intergenera-
tional discount factor (i.e. 0.20) is smaller than the intertemporal discount factor (i.e. 0.67).
This implies that in the second to last period of their life, a parent value their child 20% of
their own utility next period. The discount factor on the number child shows that the mar-
ginal increase in the value of the second child is 0.63 and of the third child is 0.48. Although
the estimated discount factor of children is close to the literature, it cannot be compared
directly to these estimates because other models do not include the life cycle dimension. For
example, in our model, a parent with horizon of 10 years, discounts the consumption of an
only child, for example, by an additional time discount 10 which is less that 0.2. Thus,
without taking into account the time dimension involved in trade-o¤s parents make when
they are young, these investments may seem to be consistent with a much lower discount
factor on the childrens utility.
The bottom panel of Table 15 presents the estimates of the utility from earnings and
the per-period net cost of existing children. It shows that, as expected, utility is increasing
with own earnings for both genders, irrespective of marital status. The coe¢ cient on spouse
earning for male is, however, negative and large in magnitude; this means that males utility
declines in the earnings of their spouse. Since our model specication implies transferable
utility between spouses in the game, these estimates imply that there is a transfer of utility
to the spouse the higher the earnings of the spouse. This may also implies higher outside
option for higher earning spouses. There is a similar e¤ect for female however of a much lower
magnitude. Finally, the bottom panel of Table 15 shows that for both married male and
female there is a per-period net cost of existing children. However, there is a per-period net
benet from a single father; this may be because the fact that most children stay with their
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mother hence the fathers utility is higher when they are not living in the same household.
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Table 15: GMM Estimates of Utility of Liesure and Discount Factors
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis; Choice 1 is the Excluded Class)
Utility of Leisure
Female Male
Choice
Labor
Market
Work
Child
Birth
Parental
Time (1) Choice
Labor
Market
Work
Parental
Time (2)
2 Part time None None -5.16 2 Part Time None 0.24
(4.0e-3) (0.02)
3 Full Time None None 0.465 3 Full Time None -0.25
(3.0e-3) (0.02)
4 Full Time Yes None -11.65 4 None Low -4.84
(6.0e-3) (0.02)
5 None None Low -0.23 5 Part Time Low -4.06
(0.02) (0.01)
6 Part Time None Low -0.64 6 Full Time Low 0.61
(0.01) (0.01)
7 Full Time None Low -1.12 7 None High -0.95
(0.04) (0.03)
8 None Yes Low -1.85 8 Part Time High -2.12
(0.01) (0.01)
9 Part Time Yes Low -4.87 9 Full Time High -0.28
(0.01) (0.01)
10 Full Time Yes Low -2.73
(0.01)
11 None None High 0.19
(0.02)
12 Part Time None High 0.2
(0.02)
13 Full Time None High -0.28
(0.02)
14 None Yes High -0.12
(0.01)
15 Part Time Yes High -2.78
(0.01)
16 Full Time Yes High -3.19
(0.01)
Discount Factors
Intertemporal  0.67
(0.02)
Intergenerational  0.20
(0.02)
Number Children  0.65
(0.01)
Utility of Earnings and Net Cost of Children
Married own earnings 0.65 Married own earnings 0.50
(0.001) (0.005)
Married Spouse earnings 0.05 Married Spouse earnings -0.38
(0.001) (0.002)
Married number of children -0.12 Married number of children -0.69
(0.02) (0.002)
Single earnings 0.64 Single earnings -0.19
(0.004) (0.004)
Single number of children -0.04 Single number of children 0.39
(0.006) (0.004)
N 50,514
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3.5 MEASURING THE QUALITY-QUANTITY TRADE-OFFS AND THE
RETURN TO PARENTAL INVESTMENT
The dynastic model provide a nature measure of the quality-quantity trade-o¤s and the
returns to parental investment. Lets consider an parent entering the nal period of his/her
life and lets further assume for convenient that he/she has completed fertility decisions. This
assumption is without lost of generality because we assume that females can not child after
the age of 45 in our implementation and so this in more relevant for male who are signicantly
older than their spouse. Taking the expectation over the choices of the last term in equation
(3.7) we can write the expected value of children at age T as
V N(xT ) =
X
i
 
p iT (k iT jxT )
"X
j
pjT (kjT jk iT ; xt)V N(kjiT ;xT )
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The average quality of a child is given by N
1 v
T V N(xT )
NT
, we can therefore measure the quality-
quantity trade-o¤ as
N(xt) 
@ log

N1 vT V N(xT )
NT

@NT
(3.20)
=
241  v + @

V N(xT )
NT

@NT
NT
V N(xT )
NT

35 1
NT
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This measure of quantity-quality trade-o¤has two components: the rst element in Equation
3.20 , 1  v; reects the rate of increase in utility with an additional child, and the elasticity
component reect the rate of decline in the average quality per child. The model then
exhibits a quality-quantity trade-o¤ if the elasticity of the average quality of a child is larger
(in magnitude) than the rate of the increase in parental utility. In general, this may not hold
in equilibrium because, as noted in Hill and Sta¤ord (1974), when parents make the time
allocation decisions in children they take into account the di¤erential e¤ect of time on the
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di¤erent children which a¤ect this trade-o¤. Next, we measure the return to parental time
investment as
D(xt) 
@ log

N1 
1 v
T V N(xT )
NT

@DT
=

@V N(xT )
@DT

1
V N(xT )
: (3.22)
This measures the aggregated return to parental time investment which measures the
impact of parental time input on educational attainment of children, their skills and therefore
life time earnings, as well as their marriage market outcomes and life time choices. If a parent
provides an additional unit of time investment, each child in the household receives an equal
share of the time. Thus, the above measure depends on the number of children in the
household.
The valuation function of the next generation (from the entire stock of children) V N(xT ),
is calculated by using the estimated structural parameters to simulate the model for each
individual in our data and calculate their terminal valuation as age 55. Table 16 presents
the estimates of the quality-quantity trade-o¤ and these aggregate return to parental time
investment. The standard errors are model errors which account for the variation in the
outcome of the model prediction as well as estimation errors.
3.5.1 Quality-Quantity Trade-o¤s
The coe¢ cients on the number of children in Table 16 measure the quality-quantity trade-
o¤s; the coe¢ cients on the linear term show that there is a trade-o¤ for both black and white
individuals, that is 1   v <  
 
@

V N(xT )
NT

@NT
NT
V N(xT )
NT

!
. The coe¢ cients on the quadratic
term shows that e¤ect is nonlinear in nature, which means that parents are not employing a
nondiscriminatory time allocation strategy (see Hanuschek (1992)(38) for a similar nding).
By comparing the estimates across race, we see that the quality-quantity trade-o¤s for black
are similiar to that for whites and an increase in number of children implies a reduction in
the average valuation function of each child. Note that we nd that the fertility behavior of
married couples does not vary signicantly with race. Turning to the gender of the children;
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we nd that the quality-quantity trade-o¤ is signicantly less for female children. This also
varies signicantly by race, with whites having more concave quality-quantity trade-o¤ for
female children than blacks.
In summary, we nd signicant quality-quantity trade-o¤ in our model. The quantity
quality trade-o¤ is smaller the larger the education of the fathers (with fathers education
reducing the trade-o¤ more than mothers education) implying a lower reduction in the
average quality of a child as a result of increase in the number of children if the father is a
white male. The e¤ect of edcuation is insignicant for black fathers. Also the education of
the mother does not matter in terms of changing the e¤ect of quality quantity trade o¤ for
a given number of children. This is related to the fact that mothers time investment work
throught the production function where college educated mother increases the likelihood of
her children attend college.
This result suggests that the lower fertility of more educated, high income households is
driven by the high cost of time of educated parents. We also nd that female have higher
valuation functions (i.e. female child expected lifetime utility is higher than a male child),
this is despite the fact that there is a female "tax" in the labor market. However, despite lower
earnings, females are more likely to obtain higher education given equal inputs and education
is highly compensated in the labor market. However, given education level, the valuation
function of females are higher because they receive high utility from their husbands income
because there are endowed with the ability to bear children and males place signicant value
on children.
3.5.2 The Return to Parental Time Investment
The coe¢ cients on the parental time investment in Table 16 summarize our estimates of
the return to parental time investment. They show that maternal parental time investment
has a signicantly higher return than parental time investment for whites; the estimated
elasticity of fathers time investment is about 40% of that of mothers time investment. For
blacks, the maternal time investment is insignicantly estimated implying a no direct e¤ect
of mothers time, whereas black fathers time investment matters and the e¤ect depends on
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the children composition in terms of gender.
Despite the fact that we found no clear patterns suggesting that motherstime is more
valuable than fathers time in terms of the education production function, white mothers
have a higher return. One possibility is that the interaction of spouses within households
is the cause. For example, if there are increasing return to scale to a parents investment,
and if because of the gender "tax" in the labor market, mother provides more parental time,
this could explain the higher return to maternal time investment. However, there is nothing
in the specication of our model that allow for increasing return to scale in the education
production or skill function. Therefore this result is driven by the di¤erential impact of
maternal and parental time on the education outcomes of children. The estimates of the
education production function Table 6 show that paternal time increases the probability
of graduating from high school and getting some college while mothers time increases the
probability of having a college degree. Thus paternal time truncates bad outcomes (i.e., not
graduating from high school) while maternal time investment increases the probability of
being a high achiever. Our estimates reveal that maternal time has a higher impact overall
than paternal time because of the higher return of graduating college in both the labor and
marriage markets. This result illustrates the advantage of aggregating the di¤erent outcomes
of children when measuring the returns to parental time investment.
Turning to race, we nd that the return to maternal time investment is insignicantly
estimated (if not negative, when we look at the sign of the coe¢ cient estimate) for blacks.
However the e¤ect of maternal time investment of a white mother is signicant and positive.
Moreover this e¤ect is independent of the number of children and the gender of the children.
Basically a white female who increases her time with children increases her returns by doing
so, however given the quality-quantity trade-o¤ she faces, the aggregate return to parental
time investment is decreasing.
For the paternal time investment, the results are more complicated and depend on both
the number and gender of the children. For black fathers, spending time increases the
returns for the rst child, and the increase is higher if the child is a girl. However for the
additional male children, the total e¤ect of time investment is negative, meaning decreasing
the aggregate return. For additional female children, the reverse is true; the returns are
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Table 16: OLS Estimates of Aggregated Return to Parental Time Investment
Dependent Variable: Log( (NT )
1 v
NT
V N(xT ))
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Baseline Model
Variables Black White
Number Children -0.663 -0.695
(0.003) (0.005)
Number Children Squared 0.067 0.070
(0.0005) (0.001)
Number of Female Children 0.112 0.187
(0.001) (0.002)
Number of Female Children Squared -0.014 -0.023
(0.0002) (0.0004)
Mother: High School -0.0004 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Mother: Some College 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Mother: College -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.002)
Father: High School -0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
Father : Some College -0.0007 0.004
(0.001) (0.002)
Father : College -0.0003 0.006
(0.001) (0.002)
Mothers Time Investment -0.0005 0.004
(0.0005) (0.001)
x Number of Children -0.00008 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.003)
x Number Female Children 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Fathers Time Investment 0.0005 0.0015
(0.0005) (0.001)
x Number of Children -0.0004 -0.001
(0.0001) (0.0003)
x Number Female Children 0.0009 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 1.401 1.505
(0.005) (0.08)
N 6,720 6,720
R-squared 0.989 0.978
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increasing in number of female children. However this increase is much less than the e¤ect of
quality-quantity trade-o¤. Therefore the nal e¤ect of having more children and increasing
the time investment will end up as decreasing the aggregate return measure given in Table
16.
For the white fathers, time investment increases the returns for the rst two children for
both male and female children, although having a girl increases it more. After the second
child, the e¤ect turns to negative for additional male children, whereas increases with the
additional female children. Similar to the black fathers, the nal e¤ect of having more
children and increasing the time investment will decrease the aggregate return measure.
The return to time investment of black mother is estimated as insignicant. One explana-
tion for this result could be the family structure di¤erences between blacks and whites. Black
provides lower maternal time investment. There is a signicantly higher number of black
single mothers than white single mothers, and single mothers invest less in their children
because it is more costly for them to specialize in parental investment.
Table 16 also shows that maternal time investment is important for white females while
not for black females. There are no di¤erences in the return to maternal time investment
between boys and girls for white mothers. However for fathers (both black and white), the
returns to paternal time investment are signicantly higher for girls. This may suggest that
fathers act in a achievement maximizing manner, favoring high ability children in the family.
Since girls have a higher likelihood of high education outcome than boys. This ndings
conict with the nding in Hanuschek (1992)(38) that parents seem to act in compensatory
or neutral manner. Our results hold for both blacks and whites while the results in Hanuscek
(1992)(38) were restricted to blacks.
3.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we developed and estimated a model of dynastic households in which altruistic
individuals choose fertility, labor supply, and time investment in children sequentially, using
data on two generations from the PSID. We then use the estimates to quantify the quality-
quantity trade-o¤s and the return to parental time investment in children. Our preliminary
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analysis shows that parental investment in children varies signicantly across gender, race,
education levels, and the household composition. It also shows that after controlling for gen-
der, education levels, and household composition, the di¤erences across race are signicantly
reduced.
The structural estimates show that there are signicant transfers between spouses within
households and that females with higher earnings potentials receive larger transfers. The
production function estimates show that both maternal and paternal time investment in-
crease the likelihood of higher educational outcome of their children. However, the impact is
complementary; fatherstime investment increases the probability of graduating from high
school and getting some college education while motherstime increases the probability of
achieving a college degree. The estimates of the education production-function show that
girls have a higher likelihood than boys of achieving higher education levels, and that blacks
have higher variance than white in their educational outcomes, after controlling for parental
inputs. Specically, blacks have higher a higher probability of not completing high school as
well graduating from college than whites.
We nd that the intergenerational discount factor (i.e. 0.20)and the intertemporal dis-
count factor is 0.67. This implies that in the second to last period of their life, a parent
value their child 20% of their own utility next period. The discount factor on the number
child shows that the marginal increase in the value from the second child is 0.63 and from
the third child is 0.49. Although the estimated discount factor of children is signicantly
larger than previous estimates in the literature, it cannot be compared directly to these es-
timates because other models do not include life cycle. For example, in our model, a parent
with horizon of 10 years, discounts the consumption of an only child by an additional time
discount 10 which is less that 0.2. Thus, without taking into account the time dimension
involved in trade-o¤s parents make when they are young, these investments may seem to be
consistent with a much lower discount factor on the childrens utility.
We nd signicant quality-quantity trade-o¤ in our model. This trade-o¤ is measured in
terms of the rate of increase in utility of parents and the rate of the decline in the average
life time utility per child resulting from having an additional child. The level of investment
per child is smaller the larger the number of children, thus, this decline in the per child
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investment is driven by the time constraint and the opportunity costs of time and not by
the properties of the production function technology of children. The negative relationship
between income (education) and fertility is therefore explained by the higher opportunity cost
of time of educated parents in terms of forgone earnings. We nd similar quality-quantity
trade-o¤ for blacks and whites. However the reasons for the same level of quality-quantity
trade-o¤ could be completely di¤erent. For instance the returns to time investment for black
females are estimated as insignicant. Therefore the e¤ect of time investment does not seem
to have a direct link for black mothers, but interacting with the other model features.
Interestingly, we nd that females have higher valuation functions (i.e. female child value
is higher than that of a male child). Despite the fact that females earn less than men with the
same productive characteristics, females are more likely to obtain a higher education level
than males, given equal amount of parental inputs and education is highly compensated in
the labor market. However, even given education level the valuation function of females
are higher than males. Despite the fact that females earn less than men with the same
productive characteristics, females are more likely to obtain a higher level of education than
males, given equal amount of parental inputs and education is highly compensated in the
labor market. However, even given the same levels of education the valuation function of
females are higher than males because they receive signicant transfers from their husbands
income. These ndings can be rationalized by the fact than females are endowed with birth
decisions and males value children, but cannot make decisions to have them.
We nd that the overall returns to fatherstime investment is only 40% that of mothers
time investment for white individuals. Maternal time investment increases the probability
of a child graduating from college, and a college degree increases the returns in both the
labor and the marriage markets. There are race di¤erences in the returns to paternal time
investment, and this interacts with the composition of the children in terms of gender in the
household. Maternal time investment of black mothers are estimated as insignicant This
may be related to di¤erent family structures between black and whites and the way this
a¤ects the channel how the time investment works.
Finally, the returns to maternal time investment is independent of the gender of the child,
however the fathers time favors girls more. This implies that fathers act in a achievement
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maximizing manner, favoring high ability children in the family. Since girls already have
a higher likelihood of achieving a high level of education than boys, father seems to invest
more time in girls than in boys as the number of children increases.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
In this appendix we will show the necessary denitions that will lead us to the representation in equation
(2.8).
The period T conditional valuation function is given as follows in equation (2.6):
v(kjT ;xT ) = u(kjT ; xT ) + 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N (kjT ;xT )
and since the state vector xT includes D1; ::; DT , H(x00jxT ; kjT ) is obtained as the expression (NT +
bT )
1 v V N (kjT ;xT )
(NT+bT )
at the corresponding state xT . Therefore:
v(kjT ;xT ) = u(kjT ; xT ) + 
X
x0
V (x00)H(x
0
0jxT ; kjT )
The period T   1 conditional valuation function is given as follows using equation (2.4)
(kjT 1;xT 1) = u(kjT 1; xT 1) + 
X
xT
V (xT )F (xT jxT 1; kjT 1).
replacing for V (xT ):
(kjT 1;xT 1) = u(kjT 1; xT 1)
+
X
xT
 X
kT
[u(kT ; xT ) + E"("T jkT ) + 
X
x0
V (x00)H(x
0
0jxT ; kT )]p(kT jxT )
!
F (xT jxT 1; kjT 1)
which is equal to:
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(kjT 1;xT 1) = u(kjT 1; xT 1) (A.1)
+
X
xT
 X
kT
[u(kT ; xT ) + E"("T jkT )]p(kT jxT )
!
F (xT jxT 1; kjT 1)
+
X
xT
 X
kT
"X
x0
V (x00)H(x
0
0jxT ; kT )
#
p(kT jxT )
!
F (xT jxT 1; kjT 1)
In order to get the representation in (2.8), we need to dene the s   t transitions, assuming the state
vector has a nite domain: x0 2 X = fx10; ::::::xL0 g and xt 2 Xt = fx1t ; ::::::xLtt g for t 2 f1; 2; ::::::Tg.
Denition 2. Let F ktt+1jt be the LtLt+1 matrix of conditional transition matrix for the state from period t to
period t+1 given the choice kt in period t. Let F
kt
t+1jt(x
m
t+1jxlt) denote themth column and lth row of the matrix
F ktt+1jt and the Lt+1  1 vector Fkt(xt+1jxt) is dened as: Fkt(xt+1jxt) = (Fkt(x1t+1jxt); ::::; Fkt(x
Lt+1
t+1 jxt))0.
Dene Lt  Lt+1 matrix Ft+1jt as the corresponding unconditional period transition matrix as follows:
Ft+1jt =
KP
kt=1
p(ktjx1t )F ktt+1jt(x1t+1jx1t ) :
KP
kt=1
p(ktjx1t ; )F ktt+1jt(x
Lt+1
t+1 jx1t )
...
...
...
...
KP
kt=1
p(ktjxLtt )F ktt+1jt(x1t+1jxLtt ) :
KP
kt=1
p(ktjxLtt )F ktt+1jt(x
Lt+1
t+1 jxLtt )

For t = 0; :::T   1 dene Ft;t+s as following:
Ft;t+r =
t+r 1Y
=t
F+1j for r > 0
Ft;t+r = ILt for r = 0
where ILt is the identity matrix of size Lt  Lt. The F (xsjxt; kjt) given in (2.8) is equal to Ft;s.
Denition 3. Let Lt  1 vector Hkt(x00jxT ) is dened as Hkt(x00jxT ) = (Hkt(x10jxT ); :; Hkt(xL0 jxT ))0 Dene
HkT as the LT L matrix of conditional transition matrix from the state in period T of current generation to
period 0 of next generation given the choice kT in period T . Finally let Hkt(xm0 jxlT ) denote the mth column
and lth row of the matrix HkT .
Denition 4. Let the function ekt(xt; p(xt)) denote the expectation of the period unobservable (preference
shock) conditional on xt and kt; ekt(xt; p(xt)) = E["tkt j xt; kt]. The vector p(xt) is the (K   1)  1 vector
of conditional choice probabilities, p(xt) = (p(1jxt); ::::; p(K   1jxt))0 Let Pt be the [Lt  (K   1)] 1 vector
of conditional choice probabilities at period t. Let utkt , ptkt and ekt(Pt) be Lt  1 vectors that stack the
corresponding elements at all states ((xt) 2 (x1t ; ::::; xLtt )) for alternative kt in period t. Dene the LT  1
vector nT = (n1T ; :::::; n
LT
T )
0 as the corresponding number of children associated with all states in period T .
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Denition 5. Let the L LT matrix Pk0;::kT be dened as follows:
Pk0;::kT =
F k01j0 
 ::::::
 F
kT 1
T jT 1
where we use the notation 
 to denote matrix multiplication whenever the content might not be clear enough
to represent without it or there are both multiplications with scalars and matrices in the same expression. 
corresponds to element by element multiplication.
Denition 6. The L L intergeneration transition matrix Hk0;::kT is dened as follows in terms of period
primitives:
Hk0;::kT =
 
TX
s=0
b(ks)
!1 v
Pk0;::kT 
HkT
Denition 7. The unconditional transition matrix HU (P ) is dened as follows in terms of period primitives:
HU (P ) =
X
k0; ::kT
2 K  :::K
p0k0 Pk0;::kT 
 pT;kT 
24 TX
s=0
b(ks)
!1 v
Pk0;::kT 
HkT
35
H(x0jxt; kjt) given in (2.8) is just obtained by:
H(x0jxt; kjt) =
X
kjt;::kT
Pkjt;::kT 
 pT;kT 
24 TX
s=t+1
[b(ks) + b(kjt) +Nt]
!1 v
Pkjt;::kT 
HkT
35
Replacing above denitions into the (A.1) leads to the representation given in (2.8).
The proof of the matrix equation given in (2.10) follows directly from the stationarity property and the
representation which make use of the conditional choice probabilities in equation (2.9). For the derivation of
this for innite time single agent dynamic optimization problems, for instance see Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002)(1).
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Data construction for the empirical application
In Appendix D, we describe in more detail the construction of our samples and the construction of the
variables used in our study. We used data from the Family-Individual File of the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). We selected individuals from year 1968 to 1997 by setting the individual level
variables "Relationship to Head" to head or wife or son or daughter. However we restricted the sample
by dropping the individuals who are son or daughter and their ages are less than 17. We set "Sex of the
Individual" to female and male and "Why Nonresponse" variable to zero categories which denotes individuals
who were still members of a panel family in PSID. For the twenty-nine-year Family Individual Respondents
File of the PSID, this initial selection produced a sample of 12,051 males and 12,744 females of which we have
at least one year of observation in the years considered. The total number of observations we initially had
for 24,795 individuals were 423,631. We lost observations due to missing data or inconsistent observations.
First type of missing data occurred with respect to the measure of the race. We used the family variable
"Race of the Household Head" to measure the race variable in our study. There is a family variable that
records information about the race of the wife separately, but this variable was included in the PSID only
for the interviewing years 1985 and 1986. Dening the race variable in our empirical study as the race of
the household head should not create much measurement error because the individuals in our sub-sample
are either household heads themselves or wives of such heads. For the interviewing years 1968-1970, the
values of 1 to 3 denote white, black, and Puerto Rican or Mexican, respectively. 7 denotes other (including
Oriental and Philippino), and 9 denotes missing data. For 1971 and 1972, the third category is redened
as Spanish-American or Cuban, and between 1973-1984, just Spanish-American. After 1984, this variable
was coded such that values of 1-4 correspond to the categories white, black, American Indian, Aleutian or
Eskimo, and Asian or Pacic Islander, respectively. A value of 7 denotes the other category, and a value of
9 denotes missing data. Missing data in this variable results in a loss of 1,780 observations.
We used the individual level variables that indicate the educational attainment level of the household
head or wife to measure the education variable. The variable "Completed Education" recorded in the
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individual part of the data record applies if the individual is a household head or wife. We used this individual
level variable to construct the educational attainment of female. In order to minimize the observation losses
due to this variables applicability, we checked any other information in the family level education variables
too. For both the head and wife, the coding of this variable is as follows: 1-16 highest grade or year of
school completed, 17 at least some postgraduate work. A value of 90 denotes missing data. However, one
di¢ culty in using the individual level education variable is that if the coding for this variable changes in
year 1991 along with the codes for family level variables for education. Before 1991, for both the head and
wife, the coding of this variable is as follows: 1: 0-5 grades, 2: 6-8 grades, 3: 9-11 grades, 4: 12 grades and
no further training, 5: 12 grades plus nonacademic training, 6: College but no degree, 7: College BA but
no advanced degree, and 8: College and advanced or professional degree. For both the heads and wifes
education variable, a value of 9 denotes missing data. Therefore in order to obtain a consistent measure
for this variable we did the following. First we found the most recent record for the individual in PSID. If
this record is in year 1991 or beyond, we coded every education value in the previous years with this value
if it is consistent across the years over 1991. If not we set the maximum of this variable as the completed
education..We removed the 9,267 observations belonging to the individuals who have the nal educational
attainment variable as either 0 or greater than 30. The education is grouped into 4 discrete classes. We set
the education be either LHS (less than high school) if education is less than 12 years; HS (high school) if
education is 12 years; SC (some college) if education is more than 12 years but less than 16 years and COL
(college) if education is equal or more than 16 years.
The marital status of a individual in our sub-sample was determined from the marital status of the head.
This variable was coded di¤erently for the interviewing year 1968, on the one hand, and the remaining years
on the other. For 1968, the values 1 through 5 denote the categories married, single, widowed, divorced, and
separated, respectively. The value 8 denotes married but spouse absent, and 9 denotes missing data. After
1968, the sixth category is dropped. There is 175 observations loss that can be attributed to this variable.
The number of individuals in a household and the total number of children within that household were also
determined from the family level variables of the same name. In 1968, a code for missing data (equal to 99)
was allowed for the rst variable, but in other years, missing data were assigned. The second variable, which
indicates the total number of children under 18 in the family regardless of their relationship to the head,was
truncated above at the value of 9 for the interviewing years 1968 and 1971. After 1975, this variable denotes
the actual number of children within the family unit.
Labor income variables are constructed from the PSID variables "Total hours worked Head, "Hours Wife
worked", "Labor income of Head", "Labor Income of Wife". The work hours reported in these variables
are annual hours for the previous working year. Similarly the labor income is the reported labor income for
the previous year. Therefore we matched those variables for the individual in a particular year by using the
variable in the previous year. The labor earnings used in the analysis and part time and full time indicator
variables are all obtained by these PSID variables. Total of 107,248 missing values generated due to missing
observations and miscoded values and 946 miscoded values were deleted immediately but the remaining
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observations were kept with the missing values. The miscoded observations deleted were the ones reporting
more than 4,380 hours annually for the total hours worked. The observations reporting positive earnings
with a value of 0 for this variable are converted to missing. Also wage rate is calculated by dividing the
annual labor earnings by the total annual hours. The observations for labor market variables were converted
to missing if the wage rate was higher than $250/hour and lower than $1/hour. The part time variable is
set equal to 1 if the individual worked less than 20 hours. week. Similarly the full time is constructed as
equal to 1 if the weekly number of labor hours is more than or equal to 20.
Maternal time is proxied by the variables of the names;"Head Weekly Housework Hours" and "Wife
Weekly Housework Hours" from the Family File of PSID. Those variables were missing in 1975 and 1982.
For these years, they were interpolated from the available data for the previous and future values. Before
1993, the missing value for this variable was dened as 99, and after it were 112. Also before 1976 there
were no record for this variable with the same name and denition in the Family le. However Individual
File has an entry for "Weekly Housework". This variable has the same context with the above variable. We
replaced the variable values with the ones from Individual File which were available for years 1969 to 1975.
We had total of 102,364 missing and miscoded observations for the constructed variable. We deleted 6,951
of them but kept the rest with the missing values. The reason we kept the missing values for the maternal
time and the labor income and participation variables is that estimation of earnings equation and the GMM
estimation of the models structural parameters (also the estimation of CCPs) requires di¤erent variables
for estimation. For instance we dont need the maternal time for the estimation of the earnings equation;
therefore we dont want to lose observations related to missing data due to maternal time. Obviously for some
of the observations, both maternal time and labor income are missing, but we delay the deletion until the
specic estimation. The discrete variable used in the structural estimation for the females time investment
is constructed from the maternal time investment variable by setting it equal to 0 if the number of weekly
housework hours is less than 30 and setting it equal to 1 if it is equal or more than 30. The reason for
choosing 30, instead of the labor market part time convention of 20 hours is due to the concentration of this
variable around 20. Since in the estimation we want to reveal the e¤ect of maternal investment, we wanted
to separate the hours which is higher than the mean level of this variable.
For the rst stage estimations, we apply further restrictions to the data in order to construct the variables
needed for the di¤erent estimations. For instance the earnings equation requires the knowledge of past 4
participation decisions in the labor market. This immediately eliminates the individuals with less than 5
years of sequential observations in the data. We have a sample of 139,827 observations that fulll all the
data requirements for this estimation. The same condition applies to the base sample since the past four
labor market part time and full time participation decisions are part of the state vector. However we do not
need those variables for the individuals at the age of 17, since this is the starting age of the individual to
the lifecycle in the empirical model and we assume the individual is not married and has not worked yet.
Therefore this will enable us to use the observations of age 17 individuals with no labor past labor market
outcomes. The argument follows similarly for age 18 individuals, since we only need to observe the age
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17 labor market outcomes for them. This generates more data than the sample used in earnings equation
estimation in this dimension, but now we need to keep track of the number of children and maternal time
investment. In the application maternal hours should be observed as early as children of the female were
born. Therefore we eliminated observations for the females who we observe at an age where they already
have their children grown up. Also we deleted all sequence of observations for a female who has missing years
in the sequence. For instance if we observe the female in years 1975, 1976, 1977, but then in years 1980,
1981,..., then we cannot include her in the analysis. Furthermore if we observe an individual, either male
and female who is married, we need to have the certain spouse characteristics available in the data. These
restrictions drop the sample to 136,916 observations. 56,812 observations are for 6,517 male and 80,104
observations are for 6,732 female individuals who fulll all data requirements. This constitutes the base
sample for the estimation of the structural parameters of the model.
Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1. To show that the continuation values are super modular it su¢ ces to show that the
per-period utility is super modular and that the transition functions are super-modular. First we show that
the per-period is super modular, i.e. u(kt; k t; xt) is super-modular in kt for any xt and k t if;
u(k0t_kt; k t; xt)+u(k0t^kt; k t; xt)  u(k0t; k t; xt)+u(kt; k t; xt) for all (k0t; kt): (B.1)
Without loss of generality let k0t  kt; given that the choice set satises partial order
u(k0t _ kt; k t; xt) = u1t(k0t; k t; xt) + u2t(k0t; k t; xt) + "k0t = u(k0t; k t; xt)
and similarly
u(k0t ^ kt; k t; xt) = u1t(kt; k t; xt) + u2t(kt; k t; xt) + "kt = u(kt; k t; xt)
Thus the condition holds.
Next we show that the transition functions are super-modular. Let PFt( bXjx; k) and PMT ( bXjx; k) be
the probabilities of the set bX  X occurring with respect to F (xt+1jxt; kt) and M(x00jx;D), i.e.
PFt( bXjx; k) = X
x02 bX
Ft(x
0jx; k)
PMs( bXjx; k) = X
x002 bX
M(x00jx;D)
We say that bX  X is an increasing set if x0 2 bX and x00  x0 imply x00 2 bX. Therefore Ft(x0jx; k) and
M(x00jx;D) are stochastically super-modular in kt for any xt and k t if:
PFt( bXjk0t _ kt; k t; xt) + PFt( bXjk0t ^ kt; k t; xt)
 PFt( bXjk0t; k t; xt) + PFt( bXjkt; k t; xt) for all (k0t; kt); (B.2)
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and
PMt( bXjk0t _ kt; k t; xt) + PMt( bXjk0t ^ kt; k t; xt)
 PMt( bXjk0t; k t; xt) + PMt( bXjkt; k t; xt) for all (k0t; kt) (B.3)
for any increasing set bX  X:Without loss of generality assume that for k0t  kt; Ft(x0jk0t_kt; k t; xt) =
Ft(x
0jk0t; k t; xt) and Ft(x0jk0t ^ kt; k t; xt) = Ft(x0jkt; k t; xt), therefore
PFt( bXjk0t _ kt; k t; xt) = X
x0 bX
Ft(x
0jk0t _ kt; k t; xt) =
X
x0 bX
Ft(x
0jk0t; k t; xt)
and
PFt( bXjk0t ^ kt; k t; xt) = X
x0 bX
Ft(x
0jk0t ^ kt; k t; xt) =
X
x0 bX
Ft(x
0jkt; k t; xt)
and the condition is satised for. M(x00jx;D) is dened in Equation 3.18. Recall that
Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; Ds(k0t _ kt; xt; k t) = Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; Ds(k0t; xt; k t))
and
Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; Ds(k0t ^ kt; xt; k t) = Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; Ds(kt; xt; k t))
Thus, Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; D) is stochastically super-modular in kt for any xt and k t: These conditions are
trivially satised for Pr(0 j e0);Pr(e0 0 j e0) from the conditional independence assumption. Therefore,
M(x00jx;D(k0t _ kt; xt; k t)) = Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; Ds(k0t _ kt; xt; k t) Pr(0 j e0) Pr(e0 0 j e0)
= Pr(e0 j xf ; xm; D0s(k0t; xt; k t)) Pr(0 j e0);Pr(e0 0 j e0) =M(x00jx;Ds(k0t; xt; k t))
And similarly M(x00jx;D(k0t ^ kt; xt; k t)) =M(x00jx;Ds(kt; xt; k t)):Thus,
PFt(cX0jk0t _ kt; k t; xt) = X
x0cX0
M(x00jx;D(k0t _ kt; xt; k t)) =
X
x0 bX0
M(x00jx;D0s)
and similarly PFt(cX0jk0t ^ kt; k t; xt) = PFt( bX0jk0t ^ kt; k t; xt) for any set bX0  X:
Next we need to show that condition Condition (ID) holds. For females, for any k0ft  kft; and given
any k0mt  kmt; xft the continuation value (k0t; k t; xt) has increasing di¤erences for every state xt; and
age t  T . First note that that the the per period utility u(kt; k t; xt) has increasing di¤erences,
u(k0t; k t; xt)  u(kt; k t; xt) = (wft(k0t)  wft(kt)) + fN (bt(k0t)  bt(kt)) +
fk0t   fkt + "k0t   "kt = u(k0t; k0 t; xt)  u(kt; k0 t; xt)
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Similarly for males for any k0mt  kmt; and given any k0ft  kft; xmt
u(k0t; k t; xt)  u(kt; k t; xt) = (wft(k0t)  wft(kt)) +
fk0t   fkt + "k0t   "kt = u(k0t; k0 t; xt)  u(kt; k0 t; xt)
We begin by deriving that for period T; the conditions for increasing di¤erences in (kt; k t) of the contin-
uation value. Note that it is also the per period utility, but unlike all other periods, it includes the expected
valuations of the children.
(k
0
T ; k
0
 T ;xT )  (kT ; k0 T ;xT ) =
 
u(k0T ; k
0
 T ; xT )  u(kT ; k0 T ; xT )

+


(NT + b
0
T )
1 v
(NT + b0T )
V N(k
0
t; k
0
 t;xT ) 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N(kt; k
0
 t;xT )

We showed above that u(k0t; k
0
 t; xT )  u(kt; k0 t; xT ) exhibits increasing di¤erences thus it is su¢ ces
to establishes conditions for the second element to exhibit increasing di¤erence, that is that
(NT + b
0
T )
1 v
(NT + b0T )
V N(k
0
T ; k
0
 T ;xT ) 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N(kT ; k
0
 T ;xT ) 
(NT + b
0
T )
1 v
(NT + b0T )
V N(k
0
T ; k T ;xT ) 
(NT + bT )
1 v
(NT + bT )
V N(kT ; k T ;xT )
First note that labor supply decisions only enter u(k0t; k
0
 t; xT )  u(kt; k0 t; xT ), thus, we only need to
verify the property for choices (k0t  kt) and
 
k0 t  k t

which have higher birth and time spent with
children decisions. We begin with (k0t  kt) and
 
k0 t  k t

for which k0t; k
0
 t have higher time spent
with children (suppose birth decisions are similar). We need to show that

V N(k
0
t; k
0
 t;xT )  V N(k0t; k t;xT )
  V N(kt; k0 t;xT )  V N(kt; k t;xT )
Note that Ds(kt; k t), is increasing in kt; k t. The above condition can be written as:
T 1X
s=0
24bsX

Is
X
x00
Vs(x
0
0)
 
M(x
0
0jxT ; Ds(k0T ; k0 T )) M(x00jxT ; Ds(kT ; k0 T ))
35+
bT
X

p
X
x00
VT (x
0
0)
 
M(x
0
0jxT ; DT (k0T ; k0 T )) M(x00jxT ; DT (kT ; k0 T ))
 
T 1X
s=0
24bsX

Is
X
x00
Vs(x
0
0)
 
M(x
0
0jxT ; Ds(k0T ; k T )) M(x00jxT ; Ds(kT ; k T ))
35+
bT
X

p
X
x00
VT (x
0
0)
 
M(x
0
0jxT ; DT (k0T ; k T )) M(x00jxT ; DT (kT ; k T ))

Thus as long as M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds(kt; k0 t) exhibits increasing di¤erences in D, the condition is satised.
Thus, as long as Vs(x
0
0) is weakly increasing in 
0
; Ed
0
 0; Ed
0
 and Pr(
0
 j Ed0) Pr(Ed0 0 j Ed0) weakly
increase in Ed0 the condition is that Pr(Ed
0
 j xf ; xm; Ds) satised increasing di¤erences which is satised
by Assumption 1.. Therefore the valuation function is weakly increasing in x00:
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Next consider k0t  kt and k0 t  k t for which let b0T = 1 and bT = 0: We need to show that
given the highest di¤erence in time spent with kids in one period, the decline in the mean quality of any
existing child is small enough. We already know that we have increasing di¤erences for all other dimensions
of the state space except for birth. Denote by d and d the lowest and highest investment level possible in
one period by one spouse. Suppose spouse  strategies k0t  kt involve same d and only di¤er by birth
decisions. Suppose k0 t involve d and that k t involve d; the condition needed for increasing di¤erences is
therefore
(NT + 1)
1 v
(NT + 1)

V N(k
0
t; k
0
 t;xT )  V N(k0t; k t;xT )

 (NT )
1 v
NT

V N(kt; k
0
 t;xT )  V N(kt; k t;xT )

Dene the average quality of the stock of children:
bVNT (kt; k0 t;xT )  1NT + 1
T 1X
s=0
24bsX

Is
X
x00
Vs(x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxf ; xm; Ds(
d
NT
;
d
NT
))
35
+
1
NT + 1
X

p
X
x00
VT (x
0
0)M(x
0
0jxf ; xm; DT (
d
NT + 1
;
d
NT + 1
))
Then su¢ cient conditions for increasing di¤erences are:
(NT + 1)
1 v
(NT + 1)

(NT + 1)
bVNT ( dNT + 1 ; dNT + 1;xT )  bVNT ( dNT + 1 ; dNT + 1;xT )


(NT )
1 v
NT

NT
bVNT ( dNT ; dNT ;xT )  bVNT ( dNT ; dNT ;xT )

Rearranging the condition for all 0  NT  T :

NT + 1
NT
1 v

bVNT ( dNT ; dNT ;xT )  bVNT ( dNT ; dNT ;xT )bVNT ( dNT+1 ; dNT+1 ;xT )  bVNT ( dNT+1 ; dNT+1 ;xT )
That is, the highest ratio of the right hand side is obtained for the largest di¤erence in time investment
of a spouse, for a one period investment, and a strategy of an individual in which the higher one has
birth. The conditions says that the increase di¤erence in average quality of a child cause be investment
di¤erence of d dNT versus
d d
NT+1
is bounded by the left hand side (which takes the lowest value at NT = T
by concavity assumption). Note that this assumption can be translated to an assumption on the transition
function M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds(k0t; k0 t)  M(x00jxf ; xm; Ds(kt; k0 t): We already assumed that the marginal
increase in investment in a child is weakly increasing in the existing stock of investment (and the spouses
investment ), thus the left hand side of the above inequality is weakly larger than 1: The additional condition
therefore bounds the increase in probability of outcomes as a function of a one period investment. In addition
valuations functions of the child are weakly increasing in parental investment. Since consumption rises in
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wages and since education increase expected wage as well as spouseseducation (assortative matching) and
expected wage, this is satised.
Finally solving backwards, we established conditions for increasing di¤erences of (k0T ; k
0
 T ;xT ).
Assuming that F (x0t+1jxt; kt) satises stochastic increasing di¤erences, we show that for period T   1, the
continuation value (kT 1; k T 1;xT 1) satises increasing di¤erences in (kT 1; k T 1). Thus, since
u(k0T 1; k
0
 T 1; xT 1) satises increasing di¤erences, F
 
xT jxT 1; k0T 1

satises stochastic increasing dif-
ferences and (k0T ; k
0
 T ;xT ) also satises stochastic increasing di¤erences, it is left to show that p(kT jxT )
in equation 3.5 satises stochastic increasing di¤erences. Because "0s are conditionally independent across
spouses, time and choices, it su¢ ces to show that the individual choice probabilities satisfy increasing dif-
ferences:
p(k0T jk0 T ; xT ) =
Z 24 Y
k0T 6=kT
1f(k0T ; k0 T ;xT )  (kT ; k0 T ;xT )  "k0t   "k0tg
35 dF"
That is
X
k0T
p(k0T jk0 T ; xT ) 
X
kT
p(kT jk0 T ; xT ) 
X
k0T
p(k0T jk T ; xT ) 
X
kT
p(kT jk T ; xT )
Dene
(k
0
T ; k
0
 T ;xT )  (kT ; k0 T ;xT )  (k0T ; kT ; k0 T ; xT )
Thus, we need to show that
Z
"
24 Y
k0T 6=kT
1f(k0T ; kT ; k0 T ; xT )  "k0t   "ktg
35 dF"  
Z
"
24 Y
k0T 6=kT
1f(k0T ; kT ; k T ; xT )  "k0t   "ktg
35 dF" =
Z
"
24 Y
k0T 6=kT
1f(k0T ; kT ; k0 T ; xT ) (k0T ; kT ; k T ; xT )  0g
35 dF"
Since for all
 
k0T ; k
0
 T ;
  (kT ; k T ; ) ;
(k
0
T ; kT ; k
0
 T ; xT ) (k0T ; kT ; k T ; xT )  0
And from conditional independence of "0s , p(k0T jk0 T ; xT ) has increasing di¤erences. By backwards in-
duction, the same proof applies for all t < T   1 thus the continuation value (kT ; k0 T ;xT ) satises
increasing di¤erences for all 0  t  T:
By backwards induction, the same proof applies for all t < T   1 thus the continuation value
(kT ; k
0
 T ;xT ) satises increasing di¤erences for all 0  t  T:
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